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INTRODUCTION

The United States is currently facing a period of intense
interest in transnational litigation Not only has the U.S. Supreme
1. The Federal Judicial Center, which is the research and education arm of
the U.S. federal judiciary, is in the process of publishing a series of judicial guides
on various aspects of international litigation. For some examples of its
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Court become increasingly active in this field,2 but the American
Law Institute (ALI) is also in the process of revising and drafting a
number of Restatements concerning international law.3 The United
States also recently signed the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
publications, see LOUISE DECARL ADLER, MANAGING THE CHAPTER 15 CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY CASE: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2011); RONALD A.
BRAND, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS (2012);
SAMUEL L. BUFFORD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY (2001); JAMES D.
GARBOLINO, THE 1980 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2012); S.I. STRONG,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES (2012).

The Federal Judicial Center makes all of its publications freely available online at
http://www.fjc.gov. More international litigation guides are currently in progress,
including TIM HARKNESS ET AL., DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES (forthcoming 2014).
2. The Court has recently heard a number of cases involving international
substantive and procedural law. See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224
(2014) (involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction); BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198
(2014) (involving bilateral investment treaties); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115
(2014) (involving personal jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746

(2014) (involving the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act);
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (involving the Alien
Tort Statute); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013)

(involving international copyright); Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct.
1138 (2013) (involving standing in international disputes); Goodyear Dunlop Tires

Operations, S.A., v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (involving general jurisdiction
in multijurisdictional matters); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780 (2011) (involving jurisdiction in international disputes).
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (forthcoming); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming); George A.

Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175, 175-99 (2009). The forthcoming Restatement
relating to Native American law also carries international implications, particularly
in the area of recognition and enforcement of judgments. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS (forthcoming) (covering federal-tribal
relations, state-tribal relations, tribal jurisdiction and authority, and Indian Country

business law); see also Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks, Lessons From the Third
Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997) ("Today, in the United
States, we have three types of sovereign entities-the Federal government, the
States, and the Indian tribes."); infra note 186 and accompanying text (noting the

forthcoming Restatement's effect on the 565 Native American nations recognized
by the federal government).
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Agreements (COCA),4 although the instrument has not yet been
ratified.
COCA is an interesting treaty with a long and storied history
dating all the way back to 1992. 6 The convention was initially part
of a larger project organized by the Hague Conference on Private
International Law that was meant to address jurisdiction as well as
the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments. When the
larger instrument proved impossible to enact, the Hague Conference
focused its efforts on choice-of-court agreements and promulgated
COCA as a second-best alternative to the combined convention.8
While COCA addresses a number of important issues relating to
4. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M. 1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text
&cid=98 [hereinafter COCA]. Although COCA has been finalized, it has not yet
come into force. Id.
5. Ratification in the United States has been delayed pending debate about
the nature of the implementing legislation. U.S. Department of State Advisory
Committee on Private International Law: Study Group on the Hague Convention
on Choice of Court Agreements, 77 Fed. Reg. 72904 (Dec. 6, 2012);
Memorandum of the Legal Adviser Regarding Implementation of the Hague
Convention
on Choice of Courts Agreement (Jan.
19, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/s/l1/releases/2013/206657.htm.
6. COCA, supra note 4; see also SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED
HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS (2003); Ronald
A. Brand, Access-to-Justice on a Due Process Platform, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 76, 81 (2012); Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the
ProposedHague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
203 (2001) [hereinafter Burbank, Equilibration];Daniel H.R. Laguardia et al., The
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: A Discussion of Foreign and
Domestic Points, 80 U.S.L.W. 1803 (2012); Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of
Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on International Business
Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 327, 337-39 (2004)
[hereinafter Silberman, Impact]; Arthur T. von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments
Abroad: Reflection on the Design ofRecognition Conventions, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 17, 19-28 (1998).
7. See The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L
LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-text.display&tid=149 (last visited
Oct. 30, 2013) (discussing the work of the Hague Conference since 1992 on
international jurisdiction as well as the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments).
8. See Yoav Oestreicher, The Rise and Fall of "Mixed" and "Double"
Convention Models Regarding Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 339, 343 (2007) (discussing the
failure of a comprehensive attempt at a convention on jurisdiction and judgments).
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jurisdictional concerns, parties to international disputes still face
difficulties with respect to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments. 9 This area of law has been problematic for
decades,' 0 although relatively little commentary exists due to the
perceived complexity of the subject matter." Indeed, "[c]ompared

9. COCA, supra note 4; see infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
10. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal
Government and InternationalEfforts to Unify Rules of PrivateLaw, 102 U. PA. L.
REV. 323, 361 (1954) (discussing longstanding issues relating to foreign
judgments); Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New
Multipolarity in TransnationalLitigation:Foreign Courts, ForeignJudgments and
Foreign Law, 18 Sw. J. INT'L LAW 31, 37 (2011) (discussing an overall increase in
the number of cases involving foreign judgments from 1990 to 2009). There is an
even earlier convention on recognition and enforcement of judgments from the
1970s that is currently in force, although it failed to find widespread acceptance.
See Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial
Matters, entry into force Aug. 20,
1979, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249, availableat http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act-con
ventions.text&cid=78 (listing five states parties).
11. Although some works are available, many discussions are somewhat out
of date or relatively cursory. See, e.g., GEORGE A. BERMANN, TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION 328-64 (2003) (predating certain key legislation); GARY B. BORN &
PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 1077-1155 (2011) (analyzing different elements of international civil law
cases in U.S. courts); BRAND, supra note 1; DAVID EPSTEIN & CHARLES S.
BALDWIN IV, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE,
AND STRATEGY 375-93 (2010); Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of ForeignMoney
Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International
Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253 (1991)

(predating certain key

legislation); Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments and
the Need for Reform, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111, 115-25 (2007)
(summarizing state law provisions); David P. Stewart, Recognition and
Enforcement ofForeign Judgments in the United States, 12 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L.
179 (2010).

50

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 33: 1

with choice of law and jurisdiction, the recognition of judgments is a
scholarly desert." 2
However, this is not an issue that the United States can afford
to ignore any longer. Experts forecast a significant increase in the
number of foreign judgments that will be brought to the United
States for recognition and enforcement in the coming years,' 3 and the
current U.S. approach to recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments involves a great deal of cost, complexity, and uncertainty,
which creates numerous problems for both U.S. and foreign parties.
12. Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the
Recognition ofForeignJudgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REv. 416, 416 (1999) ("That is
not to say that nothing is written on the topic--on the contrary, a good deal of
literature exists. However, most writers focus only on the immediate pragmatic
implications of particular laws or multilateral conventions on the recognition of
judgments."); see, e.g., Cedric C. Chao & Christine S. Neuhoff, Enforcement and
Recognition of Foreign Judgments in United States Courts: A Practical
Perspective,29 PEPP. L. REv. 147, 148-62 (2001) (discussing state-law standards).
Other authors refer to enforcement and recognition issues in the context of
jurisdiction and choice of law. See, e.g., Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a
Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments
Acceptable Worldwide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 191, 200-02 (2001) [hereinafter von Mehren, Drafting] ("It is extremely
difficult as well to draft provisions that jurists with different legal and cultural
backgrounds can be expected to understand and apply correctly."); Quintanilla &
Whytock, supra note 10, at 37 ("But transnational litigation in U.S. courts is itself
likely to be increasingly multipolar in terms of applicable law."); Louise Ellen
Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade ofParallelProceedingsand Enforcement
ofForeign Judgments in TransnationalLitigation, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv.
1, 55-59 (2004) (discussing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164-65, 202-03
(1895)); Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be
Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REv. 783, 791-99 (2004) (analyzing comity in U.S.
courts); Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1444, 1446-47 (2011) (providing a brief introduction to the intersection of forum
non conveniens and the enforcement of foreign judgments).
13. See Katy Dowell, International Litigants in London Rise by a Third in
Three Years, THE LAW. (May 7, 2013), http://www.thelawyer.com/news-andanalysis/practice-areas/litigation/international-litigants-in-london-rise-by-a-thirdin-three-years/3004520.article (noting rise of U.S. litigants in English courts);
Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 10, at 37 (projecting an increase in opinions
involving foreign judgments from 2010 to 2019); William F. Sullivan et al., A
Global Concern: The Rise of InternationalSecurities Litigation, BLOOMBERG
LAW (2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/a-globalconcern-the-rise-of-international-securities-litigation/ (discussing an increase in
multijurisdictional securities litigation worldwide).
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While domestic entities are sometimes characterized as benefitting
from an onerous enforcement regime (since that approach is thought
to reduce the number of foreign parties who are willing or able to
enforce a judgment in the United States), the truth is that U.S.
companies and individuals suffer a variety of costs as a result of a
faulty system of enforcement.
For example, a U.S.-based
commercial entity can either lose international business (due to a
foreign party's fears about its ability to recover damages against the
U.S. party in an economically efficient manner) or be made subject
to a "litigation premium" that increases the price the U.S. party must
pay to complete the transaction.14 In either case, the increased cost
of doing business will likely be passed along to U.S. consumers.
Furthermore, U.S. entities will still have to go through the process of
defending against the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment, even if it is unlikely that the movant will prevail. These
costs are also absorbed by U.S. commercial and non-commercial
parties. Finally, there is no guarantee that the U.S. party will be the
one resisting enforcement. Indeed, the U.S.-based party could very
well be the one seeking recognition or enforcement of the foreign

judgment. 15
These factors suggest that it is well past time for the United
States to review and reform its enforcement regime. The United
States could proceed in two ways. First, it could try to coordinate its
efforts with those of the international community. This approach
seems promising in many regards, since the Hague Conference
decided in 2012 to consider creating a working group to draft a new
multilateral treaty concerning the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, with work possibly beginning as early as October
2013.
However, it could take years for a new convention to be
14. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of
Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1288 (2006)
(noting transaction costs associated with the risk of litigation).
15. The U.S. party could be moving against assets held by the foreign party in
the United States or could be seeking to rely on the preclusive effect of the foreign
judgment. See infra notes 139-161 and accompanying text.
16. See Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, COUNCIL ON GENERAL AFFAIRS
AND POLICY OF THE CONFERENCE, para. 8, (Apr. 9-11, 2013), available at

http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2013concl-e.pdf;

Ronald

A.

Brand,
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finalized and adopted, and there is no guarantee that the project
would be successful.
Second, the United States could work unilaterally to improve
its enforcement regime. Although this approach has the benefits of
immediacy and autonomy, some counter-arguments can nevertheless
be raised. For example, some people could claim that COCA, which
includes a number of provisions relating to the enforcement and
recognition of foreign judgments,' 7 is sufficient to meet the present
needs of U.S. parties and that any further reform efforts should wait
until the effectiveness of COCA can be ascertained. Although
caution has its place, a wait-and-see approach is unwarranted in this
instance since COCA is limited by its terms to a small subset of
judgments arising out of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement and
relating to certain types of civil and commercial matters.' 8
Numerous disputes, including those involving consumer,
employment, succession law, personal injury and various tort claims,
fall outside the terms of the treaty and would benefit from an
improved domestic enforcement regime.
Alternatively, some people could claim that there is no real
need to reform U.S. law because international actors can avoid any
difficulties associated with recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments by taking their disputes to arbitration.' 9 However, this
Jurisdictional Developments and the New Hague Judgments Project, in A
COMMITMENT TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS
VAN LOON 89, 90 (2013) [hereinafter Brand, Hague]. Some commentators

attribute this renewed interest in the judgments project to the successful adoption
of COCA. See COCA, supra note 4; Stewart, supra note 11, at 198. However,
renewed interest in this issue may also have been triggered by the success of the
European Union in revising the European framework on jurisdiction and
judgments. See Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), 2012 O.J.
(L 351) 1 [hereinafter Brussels I Recast] (noting the new provisions will go into
effect on January 10, 2015); Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
2001 O.J. (L 12) (EC) [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]; Brand, Hague, supra, at
97-98 (discussing developments in the European Union, including the Brussel I
Regulation).
17. COCA, supra note 4, arts. 1-2, 8-9.
18. See id. arts. 1-2 (providing the scope of COCA).
19. International commercial arbitration is the primary means by which
international commercial actors resolve their disputes. See GARY B. BORN,
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argument ignores the fact that one of the primary reasons why parties
choose international commercial arbitration is to take advantage of
the ease with which arbitral awards can be enforced internationally.2 0
Given the costs associated with international commercial arbitration,
parties might very well prefer to litigate their disputes if they could
be assured of a simple and straightforward means of recognizing and
enforcing foreign judgments. Furthermore, the kinds of disputes that
are amenable to arbitration are largely analogous to those that can be
made subject to a forum selection agreement under COCA, thereby
leaving a significant subset of businesses and individuals without a

remedy.21

77-78 (2009). However, arbitration
is currently experiencing something of a backlash as parties express concerns
about costs, delays, and lack of an appeal. See WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES: STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 3-27 (2d
ed. 2012); S.I. Strong, Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Maturity
and Methodology, 29 ARB. INT'L 671 (2013) (book review) (discussing criticisms
of international commercial arbitration); S.I. Strong, Increasing Legalism in
InternationalCommercialArbitration: A New Theory of Causes, A New Approach
to Cures, 7 WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 117 (2013) (discussing reasons behind the
backlash and whether mediation can provide a remedy for the alleged ills of
international commercial arbitration).
20. International commercial arbitration offers other benefits as well,
including the ability to have a neutral decision-maker. See BORN, supra note 19, at
78-88 (discussing the perceived benefits and shortcomings of international
commercial arbitration). Arbitration also offers parties more procedural freedom
than litigation, although that distinction may be changing. See S.I. Strong, Limits
ofProceduralChoice ofLaw, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2014), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=2378979.
21. Compare COCA, supra note 4, arts. 1-2 (applying COCA to "exclusive
choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters" but placing
more than a dozen other types of cases outside of its jurisdiction), with InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 1, Jan. 30,
1975, S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-12., Pan-Am. T.S. 42 [hereinafter Panama
Convention] ("An agreement in which the parties undertake to submit to arbitral
decision any differences that may arise or have arisen between them with respect
to a commercial transaction is valid."), and United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, arts. 1-2, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention] ("[Any
state] may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising
out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as
commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration.")
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
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These factors, taken together, suggest that the United States
can and should reconsider U.S. law concerning the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments immediately and unilaterally.
Although this may appear to be a daunting task, reform efforts will
be greatly aided by a proposed federal statute drafted by the ALI in
2006 (ALI Proposed Statute).2 2 The ALI undertook this project with
the goal of creating a new and improved domestic enforcement
regime that would be suitable for adoption even in the absence of an
international treaty on judgments.23 In so doing, the ALI focused on
federal rather than state law. This decision was made on the grounds
that "[t]he only practical way to achieve uniformity among the states
in recognizing and enforcing foreign country judgments is through
federal legislation preempting state law." 24
Of course, parties can onlV benefit from the ALI Proposed
Statute if it is adopted into law.2 Congress has held some initial
hearings regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, which suggests that there is some interest in legislative
reform.26 The international business community has also thrown its
22. See ALI,
ANALYSIS AND

RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006); see also Robert L.

McFarland, Federalism, Finality, and Foreign Judgments: Examining the ALI
Judgment Project'sProposedFederalForeignJudgments Statute, 45 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 63 (2010) (noting the ALI's efforts constituted a "significant contribution to
an important discussion" regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments); Yuliya
Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It
Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 150 (2013) (proposing
an alternative federal statute based on a modified version of the ALI Proposed
Statute).
23. See Matthew H. Adler & Michele Crimaldi Zarychta, The Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: The United States Joins the
Judgment Enforcement Band, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 7 n.26 (2006)
(explaining that the ALI continued its work on foreign judgments even after
COCA was adopted).
24. Luthin, supra note 11, at 145. This approach is somewhat unusual, given
that most existing law regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
exists at the state, rather than federal, level. See infra notes 31-192 and
accompanying text.
25. ALI, supra note 22.
26. See H. R. REP. No. 112-747, at 83 (2013) (noting subcommittee hearings
held on November 15, 2011); Burbank, Equilibration,supra note 6, at 401; see
also Montr6 D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes
International,48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1233 (2007) (disucssing the ALI
presentation to Congress).
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support behind reform efforts, based on a growing recognition that a
predictable and uniform method of recognizing and enforcing
foreign judgments actually works to the benefit of U.S. companies
and individuals. 27
As positive as these measures may be, they would doubtless
be facilitated by scholarly analyses demonstrating the extent of the
problems relating to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments and the benefits of a new approach. Unfortunately, the
"scholarly desert" regarding foreign judgments extends to the ALI
Proposed Statute. 2 8 The absence of critical commentary regarding
27. See ICC Calls on Governments to Facilitate Cross-Border Litigation,
(Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Ar
ticles/2012/ICC-calls-on-governments-to-facilitate-cross-border-litigation/
(supporting efforts to facilitate transnational litigation); Recognition &
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 109,
55-67 (2011) (statement of John B. Bellinger, III, Partner, Arnold & Porter, LLP,
on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Chamber Institute for
Legal Reform) [hereinafter Bellinger Testimony].
28. Whincop, supra note 12, at 416; see also ALI, supra note 22. The ALI
Proposed Statute has been subject to some scholarly scrutiny, although most
commentators merely mention the statute in passing or address only a single aspect
of the proposal. See ALI, supra note 22; Carodine, supra note 26, at 1234
(suggesting the ALI does not sufficiently protect judgment debtors); Paul R.
Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence of
Exceptionalism in American Law, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 301, 345-46 (2008)
(putting the ALI's efforts into larger context); James P. George, Enforcing
Judgments Across State and National Boundaries: Inbound Foreign Judgments
and Outbound Texas Judgments, 50 S. TEX. L. REv. 399, 424-25 (2009)
(recognizing U.S. inaction on the proposed statute); Richard R. Graving, The
Carefully Crafted2005 Uniform Foreign-MoneyJudgments Recognition Act Cures
a Serious ConstitutionalDefect in Its 1962 Predecessor, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L.
289, 291-92 (2007) (discussing the proposed statute in the context of the absence
of federal legislation on U.S. recognition of foreign judgments); Luthin, supra note
11, at 140, 145 (discussing the ALI's hopes for the statute and its constitutional
implications); Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional
Competition and the Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United
States, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459, 460-62 (2013) (criticizing the proposed statute);
Silberman, Impact, supra note 6, at 359-61 (identifying some of the provisions of
the ALI Proposed Statute); Whytock & Robertson, supra note 12, at 1504
(comparing the ALI Proposed Statute to the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States).
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
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whether and to what extent the ALI's recommendations can and will
resolve existing problems is highly problematic, since Congress is
unlikely to act without a sense of urgency or a proper understanding
of the ramifications of the ALI Proposed Statute.29
This Article fills the analytical gap by outlining the scope of
the existing problems in this area of law and conducting a detailed
and comprehensive evaluation of the ALI Proposed Statute. Part II
provides a basic introduction to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in the United States, including actions filed in
both federal and state court and proceeding under both federal and
state law. This section also outlines various issues relating to the
preclusionary effect of foreign judgments. Next, Part III identifies
the specific problems that arise under the current enforcement
regime while Part IV considers whether and to what extent the ALI
Proposed Statute cures these concerns. 30
In undertaking this
analysis, Part IV not only compares the ALI's proposals to existing
U.S. law but also considers whether the ALI's recommendations
constitute an improvement over the current enforcement regime.
Part V concludes the Article by drawing together the various strands
of discussion.

II.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW CONCERNING THE TREATMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

Recognition and Enforcement ofForeignJudgments
in the United States

Professor Paul Stephan, one of the reporters on the upcoming
Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, has suggested that "U.S. law regarding the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is rather odd. Almost all the law
is state, even though the federal interest in international relations is
pervasive. As a result, the risk of local interests interfering with

29. ALI, supra note 22.
30. Id.
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national policy is significant." 31 Professor Linda Silberman
enunciated similar concerns during her testimony to Congress
regarding the propriety of a federal statute on enforcement and
recognition of foreign judgments, suggesting that the highly
fragmented nature of existing U.S. law has a detrimental effect on
the foreign relations of the United States. 32
This is not to say that all foreign judgments should be
recognized and enforced without proper scrutiny from U.S. courts.
Indeed, Professor Stephan has noted that "the rise of populist
governments in countries where significant U.S. investment is
located, especially in the Western hemisphere, has led to several
dubious local judgments that U.S. courts have rejected."3 3 However,
some observers believe that wider enforcement of certain types of
foreign judgments is necessary to give effect to certain international
human rights norms.34
Although issues in this field appear to be limited to the realm
of "international" concerns, recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments actually implicates a variety of domestic laws and
policies. Indeed, recent developments regarding COCA have lent a
certain "urgency to a broader debate about the role of federalism in
enforcing foreign judgments. Traditionally states have regulated the
31. UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, 26th Sokol Colloquium Will Explore
Implications ofForeignJudgments, (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.1aw.virginia.edu/h
tml/news/2013 spr/sokol.htm [hereinafter Colloquium]; see also CurrentProjects,
Restatement Fourth, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, ALI,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfn?fuseaction=projects.members&projectid=28
(last
visited Oct. 31, 2013).
32. See Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3-17 (2011) [hereinafter Silberman Testimony] (statement
of Linda Silberman, Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University School
of Law) (identifying issues with a lack of consistency in the existing recognition
and enforcement regime and calling for a more uniform approach to ensure
predictability and clarity in the law).
33. Colloquium, supra note 31; see also Bellinger Testimony, supra note 27
(discussing industry support for the Hague Choice of Law Convention); Rosen,
supra note 12, at 785 (discussing "un-American" judgments).
34. See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic
Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 182-200 (2001) (discussing the
connection between enforcement of foreign judgments and human rights).
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terms of enforcement of foreign judgments, even though the federal
constitution governs enforcement of state judgments within the
United States. The states in turn have adopted uniform laws,
although not universally." 35 As a result, any reforms relating to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments will need to
consider matters of both state and federal law, including those of a
constitutional nature.3 6
At this point, a significant amount of diversity exists within
the United States with respect to both the substance and procedure
relating to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
This phenomenon arises as a result of two factors: (1) the largely
unchallenged belief that each state is constitutionally entitled to
adopt its own unique approach to recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments and (2) basic principles of civil procedure
requiring federal courts to follow state law principles in certain
circumstances.3 7
Nevertheless, some unifying forces do exist. 38 For example,
virtually every state follows the guidelines set forth by the U.S.
35. Colloquium, supra note 3 1; see also COCA, supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
36. See McFarland,supra note 22, at 70-82 (indicating that the applicability
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not eliminate the need to consider both
state and federal law); Shill, supra note 28 (noting that no federal law controls the
domestication of foreign judgments); Colloquium, supra note 31 (discussing the
disparity of procedures concerning enforcement of foreign judgments).
37. See ALI, supra note 22, at 2 (attributing the change to Johnson v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1926), in the state
courts and Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in the federal courts);
BRAND, supra note 1, at 1. However, there is relatively little discussion of the
constitutional issues that arise. See McFarland,supra note 22, at 75-82 (rejecting
the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to enforcement of foreign
judgments); Linda Silberman, TransnationalLitigation: Is There a "Field"?A
Tribute to Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1427, 1432 n.20 (2006)
[hereinafter Silberman, Maier] (observing that "recognition and enforcement of
foreign-country judgments is presently governed by state law").
38. Indeed, some commentators have concluded that "[i]n practice, U.S.
law ... is neither as diffuse nor as complicated as many fear." Stewart, supra note
11, at 180; Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 46-54 (2011) (statement of H. Kathy Patchel, Uniform
Law Commissioner). However, other observers take the opposite view. See
Bellinger Testimony, supra note 27 (describing the current system of state laws as
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Supreme Court in the seminal case of Hilton v. Guyot.39
Furthermore, a majority of states have adopted one of two model acts
promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission (previously known as
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
or NCCUSL) regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.4 0
U.S. law and procedure, therefore, reflect a considerable
amount of tension between uniformity and diversity. The following
discussion considers the impact of these twin forces on both litigants
and society as a whole.
1.

Federal Court

Most foreign parties involved in U.S. litigation prefer to be in
federal court, since federal judges are perceived as being less prone
than state judges to bias based on nationality.41 However, federal
courts have only limited jurisdiction, and litigants typically must
demonstrate that both personal and subject matter jurisdiction exist
before a matter can be heard by a federal court.42
These
a "patchwork"); Silberman Testimony, supra note 32 (emphasizing that there is
"no uniformity of practice" among the states).
39. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895); see also BRAND,
supra note 1, at 3 (stating that "most state and federal court decisions on
recognition of foreign judgments follow some version of the U.S. Supreme Court's
comity analysis" in Hilton).
The Uniform Law
40. Infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
Commission provides model legislation in those areas of law that would benefit
from standardization at the state level. About the ULC, UNIF. L. COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About the ULC (last visited Feb.
21, 2013).
41. See Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1771, 180910 (2012) (discussing the assertion that federal judges are superior arbiters of
federal rights); Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal
Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1998) (suggesting that "xenophobia
remains an issue in state courts"); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum
Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 530 n.215 (2011) (pointing to sources
suggesting that foreign defendants see federal courts as more "congenial" than
state courts).
42. See 4 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 1063, 3522 (3d. ed. 2012) (discussing subject matter
jurisdiction of federal courts).
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constitutional requirements can cause significant uncertainty for
parties involved in an action to recognize and enforce a foreign
judgment. For example, it is unclear whether parties must meet the
"minimum contacts" test relating to personal jurisdiction over a
person or property in cases involving the recognition or enforcement
of a foreign judgment.4 3 Some courts, such as those sitting in New
York State, take the view that:
the judgment debtor need not be subject to personal
jurisdiction in New York before the judgment creditor
may obtain recognition and enforcement of the
foreign country money judgment, as neither the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution nor
New York law requires that the New York court have
a jurisdictional basis for proceeding against a
judgment debtor.4
43. See BRAND, supra note 1, at 11 n.48 (collecting cases applying the
minimum contacts test); see also Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121-24
(2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755-58 (2014); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-12 (1987) (O'Connor, J.)
(discussing the application of the stream of commerce and minimum contacts tests
to defendant's conduct in California); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 478-79 (1985) (discussing the application of the minimum contacts test to
defendant's conduct in Florida); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984) (noting "due process is not offended by a state's
subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are significant
contacts between the state and the foreign corporation"); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (applying the minimum contacts
test); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977) (describing the differences
between in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem jurisdiction); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (explaining that defendants must have minimum
contacts in the territory of a forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'); FED. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2). This test establishes the limits of a court's extraterritorial ("long-arm")
jurisdiction as a matter of U.S. constitutional law and can apply in state as well as
federal court. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (2013) (extending
jurisdiction to the full extent of state and federal constitutional limits); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-3-201 (2013) (extending jurisdiction to the full extent of the federal
constitution).
44. Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 281 A.D.2d 42, 43 (2001); see also Pure
Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (N.D. Iowa 2002) ("[I]n
the context of the recognition and enforcement of other state judgments, the
minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause does not prevent a state
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However, other courts require parties seeking to recognize or
enforce a foreign judgment to meet the constitutional tests relating to
jurisdiction over the person or property of the defendant. 4 5 These
discrepancies obviously make it difficult for parties to predict what
standard will apply in any particular situation.
Constitutional standards relating to subject matter jurisdiction
are equally ambiguous, at least in cases involving diversity
jurisdiction.4 7 For example, as a general rule, diversity jurisdiction
from enforcring another state's valid judgment against a judgment-debtor's
property located in that state, regardless of the lack of other minimum contacts.").
45. See Electrolines v. Prudential Assurance Co., 677 N.W.2d 874, 885
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the court must possess jurisdiction over the
judgment debtor or the judgment debtor's property); BRAND, supra note 1, at 11.
Some commentators have suggested that cases relating to the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards can or should be relevant to the question of whether the
minimum contacts test should be applied in cases involving the enforcement of
foreign judgments. See BRAND, supra note 1, at 11 n.47. However, that approach
appears inappropriate, given that the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is
governed by treaty and the enforcement of foreign judgments is not. See BORN,
supra note 19, at 65-79; S.I. Strong, ConstitutionalConundrums in Arbitration, 15
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 41 (2013) (discussing constitutional issues in
arbitration).
46. Notably, this issue does not appear to be addressed in the ALI Proposed
Statute, which suggests continuing confusion in this regard. See ALI, supra note
22, at 19 (discussing Section 9 under the proposed statute, which contemplates
action "where the judgment debtor is subject to personal jurisdiction" or "where
assets belonging to the judgment debtor are situated," but not indicating whether
constitutional tests must be met).
47. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, §§ 3602.1, 3604 (discussing 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a); U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 1). Although some courts and
commentators refer to matters involving "citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state" as constituting "alienage" jurisdiction, most authorities
combine those situations with suits between "citizens of different States" under the
single heading of "diversity" jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also Walter C.
Hutchens, Alienage Jurisdictionand the Problem of Stateless Corporations: What
Is a Foreign State for Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), 76 WASH. U. L. Q.
1067, 1072 (1998) (emphasizing that "not only do diversity and alienage
jurisdiction apply to different types of parties, they are also founded on different
rationales."); Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical
Foundations and Modern Justificationsfor Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes
Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1996) (noting the "academic
preoccupation" with diversity jurisdiction and highlighting the dearth of attention
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does not exist in cases arising entirely between non-U.S. parties,
which could end up barring certain types of enforcement actions that
would otherwise appear to be prime candidates for federal court. 48
However, non-U.S. parties can bring an enforcement action in
federal court even if no U.S. party is involved if another type of
subject matter jurisdiction (such as that based on a question of
constitutional or federal law) exists.4 9
a.

Substantive Law in FederalCourt

Once the litigants find themselves properly in federal court,
they must determine what law controls substantive issues.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins,

the substantive law to be applied by the federal courts
in any case is state law, except when the matter before
the court is governed by the United States
Constitution, an Act of Congress, a treaty,
international law, the domestic law of another
country, or, in special circumstances, by federal
common law.o

given to alienage jurisdiction). This Article will follow the general practice and
refer to alienage jurisdiction under the more general heading of diversity
jurisdiction.
48. See Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) (noting that
one of the parties must be a U.S. citizen in order for federal courts to have
diversity jurisdiction); Gall v. Topcall Int'l, No. Civ. A. 04-CV-432, 2005 WL
664502, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2005) (discussing the historical interpretation
of alienage jurisdiction); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 3604 (discussing
diversity jurisdiction in suits with citizens or subjects of foreign states as parties).
49. This may be becoming increasingly difficult to do. See Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (discussing extraterritorial
application of the Alien Tort Statute); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.
Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010) (dismissing claim in "foreign cubed" securities action).
50. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 4501; see also Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938). The Erie doctrine applies to both diversity
and alienage jurisdiction. See Michael Steven Green, Erie's InternationalEffect,
107 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 165, 166 n.7 (2012) (acknowledging that the Erie
doctrine applies to alienage jurisdiction).
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Although Erie is subject to a number of exceptions, it clearly
applies in matters relating to the recognition and enforcement of
This phenomenon adds a number of
foreign judgments.
complexities and ambiguities to the process of recognizing and
enforcing a foreign judgment.
1.

Substantive law in cases
involving federal question
jurisdiction

According to the Erie doctrine, courts whose subject matter
jurisdiction is based on a question of federal law must rely on
substantive federal law to determine whether and to what extent a
foreign judgment should be recognized and enforced. 52 However, at
this point, there is no general federal statute describing the
circumstances in which foreign judgments can or should be
recognized or enforced.5 3 As a result, courts must look to federal
common law.5 4
The common law in question arises out of the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Hilton v. Guyot, which indicates that recognition
51. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 4501.
52. See Hurst v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 474 F. Supp. 2d
19, 32 (D.D.C. 2007) ("[I]n determining whether to recognize the judgment of a
foreign nation, federal courts .

.

. apply their own standard in federal question

cases."); see also Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (noting that in
non-diversity cases, "federal courts will apply their own rule" of res judicata);
Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 248 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. c (1988) (observing that the recognition of
foreign judgments is governed by state law except in federal question cases).
53. Federal legislation has recently been enacted in one limited area of law.
See infra notes 66, 86-87 and accompanying text.
54. Some debate exists about the scope and continuing viability of federal
common law, but the principle appears to have continued relevance in the field of
foreign judgments. See BRAND, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113 (1895), is the foundation of federal common law regarding foreign
judgments); Green, supra note 50, at 166 (emphasizing that after Erie, "diversity
jurisdiction does not give a federal court the power to make federal common
law"); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100
Nw. U. L. REv. 585, 585-87 (2006) (noting "well-established and stable pockets of
federal common law persist in several areas [such as] . . . cases affecting

international relations").
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and enforcement of foreign jud ments is primarily based on the
principle of international comity. Thus,
where there has been opportunity for a full and fair
trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction,
conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant,
and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice between the
citizens of its own country and those of other
countries, and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under
which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity
of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits
of the case should not, in an action brought in this
country upon the judgment, be tried afresh ....
Some authorities have occasionally justified the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments on principles other than
comity.57 However, this change in rationale does not alter the basic
standards and procedures that are applicable as a practical matter.ss

55. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895) (discussing the
application of comity in cases involving foreign judgments); BRAND, supra note 1,
at 3 (recognizing Hilton as the foundation of federal common law).
56. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03; see also BRAND, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting
Hilton). Although Hilton was at one point read as requiring reciprocity of
recognition between the United States and the country in which the judgment
originated, the need for reciprocity has diminished in the years since the case was
decided. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 210-28 (discussing reciprocity requirement);
BRAND, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing cases that reject the need for reciprocity
after Hilton).
57. For example, the Restatement (First) of the Conflict of Laws took the
view that "a foreign judgment creates a 'vested right' or 'legal obligation' that is
entitled to enforcement wherever the judgment debtor or his property can be
found." BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 11, at 1082 (internal citation omitted).
58. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03 (stating the basic requirements of comity);
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 11, at 1082; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1988) ("A valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation
after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States
so far as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned.").
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Substantive law in cases
involving diversity jurisdiction

The situation is very different when the court that has been
asked to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment is hearing the case
in diversity. In these circumstances, Erie requires the court to look
to state rather than federal law to determine issues of substance. 59
While the principles enunciated in Hilton remain important in state
law analyses (thereby providing jurisprudential consistency across
the federal-state divide), state law draws on a number of different
statutory and common law authorities. 60 The various nuances of
state law can, and often do, create considerable uncertainty for
parties seeking recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in
federal court, as discussed below. 6 1
b.

Proceduresinfederal court

Because the Erie doctrine only applies to matters of
substantive law, parties might expect that procedures for enforcing
and recognizing a foreign judgment would be the same in every
federal court across the country, regardless of the basis on which
subject matter jurisdiction is asserted. However, unanticipated
problems again arise, this time as a result of Rule 69 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that "[t]he procedure on
execution . . . must accord with the procedure of the state where the

court is located."63 Although Rule 69 also indicates that "a federal
statute governs to the extent it applies,"64 "[t]here is no general
federal law governing the procedure for the enforcement of foreign
judgments," which means that federal courts must look to state law
to determine matters of procedure in the vast majority of cases. 6 5
The one exception is in the area of free speech, although the statutes
in effect in that area have more to do with easing the restrictions on
federal subject matter jurisdiction than with enforcement procedures
59. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938); BRAND, supra
note 1, at 4.
60. See BRAND, supra note 1, at 4, 6-9 (discussing the various authorities
state courts look to when faced with controversies already resolved in another
nation).
61. Infra notes 66-131 and accompanying text.
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per se. 66 Thus, litigants involved in the recognition and enforcement
of foreign awards in federal court face complexity and uncertainty
with regard to procedural as well as substantive law.
2.

State Court

As the preceding discussion suggests, actions to recognize or
enforce a foreign judgment in the United States are primarily
governed by state law, regardless of whether the matter is heard in
state or federal court. Although each individual state is allowed to
adopt its own rules regarding the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, the Uniform Law Commission has attempted to
promote consistency in this area of law by promulgating two
different model enactments. Most U.S. states have adopted one or
the other of the two statutory schemes, although some jurisdictions
have retained a common law approach to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.
The first form of model legislation proposed by the Uniform
Law Commission was the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act (1962 Act).6 7 This enactment, which is currently in
force in whole or in part in sixteen states, "applies to any foreign
judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where
rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject
to appeal." 6 8 A foreign judgment is "conclusive between the parties
62. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79 ("Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a state.").
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 69.

64. Id.
65. BRAND, supra note 1, at 5; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS
§ 99.
66. See Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established
Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2480
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05 (2012)) [hereinafter SPEECH Act] (allowing
for removal to federal court when the parties are diverse, but eliminating
requirements regarding the amount in dispute); BRAND, supra note 1, at 29
(discussing the SPEECH Act).
67. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N
[hereinafter
1962
ACT],
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20money%20judgments%20rec
ognition/ufinjra%20final%20act.pdf.
68. Id. § 2. At one time, the 1962 Act was in force in as many as thirty-one
states along with the District of Columbia, although fifteen states and the District
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to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money." 69
Although the 1962 Act applies to a wide range of disputes, it does
not address matters involving taxes, fines, or penalties, even if a
final, monetary judgment exists, since those types of judgments
constitute a form of revenue for the state.7 0
In 2005, the Uniform Law Commission revised the 1962 Act
by promulgating the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act (2005 Act).7 ' Eighteen states plus the District of
Columbia have adopted the 2005 Act in whole or in part.7722 The 2005
Act applies to a similar subset of judgments (i.e., those that involve
"recovery of a sum of money" and are "final, conclusive, and
enforceable" where rendered) but differs from the 1962 Act in a
number of ways. 73 For example, the 2005 Act addresses issues of
procedure as well as substance and includes provisions relating to the
burden of proof and the statute of limitations.74 However, the 2005
Act, like the 1962 Act, explicitly states that it does not apply to
money judgments involving taxes, penalties, or fines. 5 The 2005

of Columbia have since repealed the 1962 Act in favor of more recent legislation.
See BRAND, supra note I app. D (listing specific state law provisions and
identifying repeals); see also 1962 ACT, supra note 67 (listing states, although
repeals are not indicated).
69. 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 3.
70. Id. § 1(2); see also BERMANN, supra note 11, at 353-55 (discussing the
revenue rule in the context of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments);
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 11, at 1102 (same).
71. Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIF.
LAW
COMM'N
[hereinafter
2005
ACT],
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20country%20money%2Ojudg
ments%20recognition/ufcmjra final_05.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
72. For a list of the specific state law provisions, see BRAND, supra note 1
app. D; see also 2005 ACT, supra note 71 (listing states that adopted the act). The
Uniform Law Commission provides a list of the ways in which the 2005 Act is
superior to the 1962 Act. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, at 1 (discussing "Why
States Should Adopt").
73. 2005 ACT, supra note 7171, §§ 3(a), 4(a); see also 1962 ACT, supra note
67.
74. 2005 ACT, supra note 71, §§ 3(c), 4(d), 9; see also BRAND, supra note 1,
at 7-8.
75. 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 3(b); see also 1962 ACT, supra note 67,
§ 1(2).
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Act also excludes judgments relating to divorce or maintenance from
its scope. 76
The remaining sixteen states rely on common law principles,
including those reflected in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law. 7 According to the Restatement, a foreign judgment
"granting or denying recovery of a sum of money" is entitled to
recognition and enforcement in a U.S. court if the judgment is
"final" and "conclusive between the parties."7 8 However, the
Restatement is somewhat broader than the two statutory enactments,
in that it is not limited to money judgments and also contemplates
recognition and enforcement of final, conclusive judgments
"establishing or confirming the status of a person, or determining
interests in property . . . "79 Although these latter types of judgments
can also be recognized and enforced in jurisdictions operating under
either the 1962 Act or the 2005 Act, courts in those instances would
have to rely on common law principles rather than statutory law.80
Parties seeking recognition and enforcement can also rely on certain
subject-specific statutes.
Thus, the International Support
81
Enforcement Act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, 82 and the amended Uniform Interstate Family

76. 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 3(b).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987); see also
BRAND, supra note 1, at 6-7.
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481 (1987).
79. Id.
80. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 3(b) (explaining that the Act does not
apply to judgments for taxes, fines, or penalties, or in connection with domestic
relations); 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 1(2) (limiting the definition of an applicable
"foreign judgment" in a similar manner); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
202-03 (1895) (establishing the general principle that where there has been a full
and fair trial abroad, the merits of the case should not be retried in the United
States).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 659a (2012).
82. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N, availableat http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/child-custodyjuri
sdiction/uccjea-final_97.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013); BRAND, supra note 1, at
13.
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Support Act can all be used to recognize and enforce judgments
involving domestic relations. 84
Most legislation concerning the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments attempts to facilitate the process. However,
some concerns have been raised relating to the possibility that some
jurisdictions (most notably England) allow libel to be established
more easily than would be the case under the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.85 As a result, various state86 and federal87 laws
have been enacted to ensure that any foreign judgment that is
recognized and enforced complies with U.S. standards regarding free
speech.
There is one other form of model legislation that deserves
mention since it causes considerable confusion in this area of law.
The 1964 Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
(1964 Act) is a model act adopted by forty-six of the fifty U.S. states
as well as the District of Columbia.88 Although this enactment
discusses procedural issues relating to the enforcement of foreign
judgments, the term "foreign judgments" in this case refers to
judgments from U.S. sister states rather than judgments from other

83. Interstate Family Support Act Amendments, UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
availableat http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/interstate%20family%20sup
port/uifsa final 08.pdf; BRAND, supra note 1, at 13.
84. This area of law is changing rapidly in Europe. See Horatia Muir Watt,
European Federalism and the "New Unilateralism", 82 TUL. L. REv. 1983,
1985-86 (2008) (discussing the revolution in European conflict of laws to protect
cross-border relationships).
85. See BRAND, supra note 1, at 29 (discussing the concerns created by
heightened protection for speech in the United States); Lili Levi, The Problem of
Trans-NationalLibel, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 523-28 (2012) (explaining "libel
tourism" due to disparities in regulation between the United States and the United
Kingdom).
86. One such provision, known as the Libel Terrorism Protection Act, was
passed by the New York state legislature. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2008).
87. See, e.g., SPEECH Act, supra note 66 (making foreign libel judgments
unforceable in U.S. courts unless they comply with First Amendment protections).
88. Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N [hereinafter 1964 ACT], availableat http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/enforcement%20of%20judgments/enforjdg64.pdf; see BRAND, supra 1, app.
D (listing forty-eight adopting jurisdictions, including the Virgin Islands).
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countries. 89 Although some states have relied on the 1964 Act in
cases involving international recognition and enforcement (thereby
opening the door for federal courts sitting in those same states to do
the same), the 1964 Act should be primarily viewed as a means of
facilitating full faith and credit between individual U.S. states rather
than as a mechanism providing for recognition and enforcement of
judgments in the international context.90
a.

Substantive Law in State Court

Regardless of the precise legal framework adopted by a
particular state, the basic approach to matters of substantive law is
approximately the same in that recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment that is final, conclusive, and enforceable in its
home jurisdiction is presumed to be appropriate for recognition and
enforcement in the United States in the absence of certain
disqualifying factors. 91 Grounds for non-recognition may be either
mandatory or discretionary. 92
The list of mandatory grounds for non-recognition
and -enforcement is relatively short. For example, the 1962 Act
indicates that a foreign judgment cannot be recognized or enforced
if:
*

it was "rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law";

89. See id. § 1 (defining foreign judgments as those that are from "a court of
the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit").
90. See id.; BRAND, supra note 1, at 5.
91. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(a) (providing for the recognition of
foreign-country judgments as long as they meet certain standards); 1962 ACT,
supra note 67, § 3 (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481
(1987) (same). Case law provides guidance as to what constitutes a final,
conclusive, and enforceable judgment. See BRAND, supra note 1, at 9-10; Chao &
Neuhoff, supra note 12, at 152-53 (noting that courts look to the law of the
rendering country to determine the finality of a judgment).
92. See BRAND, supra note 1, at 7-8, app. C (comparing requirements for
mandatory and discretionary enforcement). Most of the factors leading to
non-recognition and -enforcement are enunciated in Hilton v. Guyot. See Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895) (listing several factors relating to the
opportunity for a "full and fair trial").
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"the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over
the Defendant"; or
"the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter" of the dispute. 93

The 2005 Act repeats these basic principles with only minor changes
in language.9 4 However, those states following a common law
approach to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
consider only the first two items to act as a mandatory bar to
recognition or enforcement in a U.S. court.95
Neither the 2005 Act, the 1962 Act, nor the Restatement
provides any further definition of the first ground for nonrecognition and -enforcement (i.e., what constitutes an impartial
tribunal or a procedure that is incompatible with due process).9 6
However, U.S. courts have consistently characterized these terms as
referring to systemic unfairness rather than unfairness in a particular
proceeding. 97 When determining whether a particular legal system
meets the necessary standards, U.S. courts consider evidence from a
variety of sources including the constitution of the foreign country,
U.S. State Department reports regarding foreign judicial practices,
expert testimony, and the existence of treaties between the United
States and the other country regarding reciprocal access to courts. 9 8
93. 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 4(a).
94. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(b) (providing that a court may refuse to
recognize a foreign judgment if "(1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial
system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law; (2) the foreign court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant; or (3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter").
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(1) (1987)
(listing the absence of impartial tribunals and lack of jurisdiction over defendants
as grounds for non-recognition ofjudgments).
96. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71; 1962 ACT, supra note 67; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1987), supra note 77.
97. BRAND, supra note 1, at 13-14.
98. See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2000)
(considering the Liberian Constitution); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406,
1411-12 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering U.S. State Department reports); S.C.
Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enters. Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 208, 214 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (considering expert testimony); BRAND, supra note 1, at 15-17.
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Although reciprocity is not required under the 1962 Act, the 2005
Act, or Hilton v. Guyot, some states have included such a
requirement either on a mandatory basis (Georgia and
Massachusetts) or a discretionary basis (Florida, Idaho, Maine, North
Carolina, Ohio, and Texas). 99
The second mandatory ground for non-recognition and enforcement (i.e., lack of personal jurisdiction by the foreign court)
is further defined in Section 5 of the 1962 Act, Section 5 of the 2005
Act, and Section 421 of the Restatement. 00 According to the 1962
Act and the 2005 Act, personal jurisdiction is proper in cases of
personal service, voluntary appearance, prior consent to jurisdiction
of the foreign court, domicile, and commercial conduct. 01 The
Restatement formulation is slightly more complicated, although the
underlying principles are essentially the same.102 On their face,
provisions regarding the need for personal jurisdiction appear to
consider the issue solely from the perspective of the court rendering
the judgment in question. However, U.S. courts often interpret these
principles in light of U.S. standards of due process.103 In so doing,
99. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 113, 202-03 (1895); 2005 ACT, supra
note 71; 1962 ACT, supra note 67; Stewart, supra note 11, at 183; see also supra
note 56 (discussing the diminishing need for reciprocity following Hilton). The
common law does not appear to include such a requirement. See Somportex v.
Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 n.8 (3d Cir. 1971) (observing that
reciprocity has not been an "essential precondition" to enforcing a foreign
judgment).
100. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 5 (listing situations in which a foreign
court lacks personal jurisdiction); 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 5 (listing situations
in which a foreign judgment will not be refused recognition for lack of personal
jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 421 (1987) (listing
instances in which jurisdiction is "reasonable").
101. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 5(a); 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 5(a).
These grounds may be expanded as a matter of state law. See 2005 ACT, supra
note 71, § 5(b); 1964 ACT, supra note 88, § 5(b).
102. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 5(a); 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 5(a);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 77, § 421 (1987).
103. See, e.g., Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc. 640 F.2d 77, 78-80 (7th Cir.
1981) (finding that contacts were "insufficient to reach the minimum level needed
to satisfy due process requirements" necessary to enforce judgment); Mercandino
v. Devoe & Raynolds, Inc., 436 A.2d 942, 943-44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981) (observing that "the minimum contacts standard provides assurance that the
exercise of jurisdiction 'does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice') (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945));
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482 cmt. C (1987)
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courts emphasize U.S. constitutional standards, as defined by
International Shoe and its progeny, rather than U.S. statutory
requirements. 104
The third ground for non-recognition and -enforcement (i.e.,
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by the rendering court) is only
mandatory under the 2005 Act and the 1962 Act. 105 According to
the Restatement, the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction only
constitutes a discretionary ground for non-enforcement. 106 In either
case, questions regarding the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
foreign court are typically considered pursuant to standards
identified by foreign law, not U.S. law.1 07
Although U.S. courts must deny recognition or enforcement
of a foreign judgment if any of these three (or in the case of the
Restatement, two) grounds exist, recognition and enforcement may
be denied in other circumstances as a matter of discretion.'s Thus,
for example, the 1962 Act indicates that a U.S. court may refuse to
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment in cases where:
(noting that articulated bases to adjudicate satisfy the requirements of due process
in the United States).
104. See BERMANN, supra note 11, at 339-41; see also Walden v. Fiore, 134
S. Ct. 1115, 1121-24 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755-58
(2014); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-12 (1987)
(discussing the requirements for the assertion of personal jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-79
(1985) (evaluating the assertion of personal jurisdiction for comportment with "fair
play and substantial justice"); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (noting that due process is met when personal
jurisdiction is asserted over a defendant that has "certain minimum contacts ...
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice") (internal citations omitted); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1980) (considering due process
limitations on jurisdiction); Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (holding that due process
requires that a defendant have "certain minimum contacts with a forum such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice"') (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 357 (1940)).
105. See 2005 Act, supra note 71, § 4(b); 1962 Act, supra note 67, § 4(a).
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(2)(a) (1987).
107. See BRAND, supra note 1, at 20 ("[W]hen ruling on the question of
subject matter jurisdiction, U.S. courts apply the jurisdictional rules of the foreign
court.").
108. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text (explaining mandatory
grounds for non-recognition and -enforcement ).
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* "the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did
not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to
enable him to defend";
* "the judgment was obtained by fraud";
* either the cause of action or the claim for relief
associated with the foreign judgment "is repugnant to the
public policy" of the forum state;
* "the judgment conflicts with another final and
conclusive judgment";
* the foreign proceedings were contrary to a forum
selection clause or arbitration agreement; or
* "in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal
service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient
forum for the trial of the action." 09
These six grounds are supplemented in the 2005 Act by two
additional provisions.' 10 Thus, a court operating under the 2005 Act
may refuse recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment as a
matter of discretion if "the judgment was rendered in circumstances
that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court
with respect to the judgment."' 1
Furthermore, a court proceeding under the 2005 Act may
refuse a request to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment if "the
specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was
not compatible with the requirements of due process of law."' 2
Both of these grounds for non-recognition and -enforcement
address concerns with a specific judgment, not the judicial system as
a whole.
The 2005 Act exceeds the scope of the 1962 Act in other
ways. For example, the 2005 Act allows objections based on public
109. 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 4 (b).
110. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c) (listing additional grounds for
non-recongition of a foreign-country judgment).
111. Id. § 4(c)(7).
112. Id. § 4(c)(8); see also BRAND, supra note 1, at 8-9 (discussing how the
SPEECH Act prevents recognition and enforcement in a defamation action of a
foreign court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant when it is
inconsistent with U.S. due process standards).
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policy to include concerns relating to both the judgment itself and
the underlying cause of action, whereas the 1962 Act only
contemplates the latter.1 1 3 Furthermore, the 2005 Act allows courts
to consider the public policy of either the forum state or the United
States as a whole, while the 1962 Act only refers to the former.1 14
The Restatement approach is in many ways similar to the two
statutory provisions. For example, the Restatement allows courts to
deny recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment as a matter
of discretion in cases involving lack of notice, fraud, conflicts with
another judgment, or a forum selection agreement."' 5 However, the
Restatement differs from both the 2005 Act and the 1962 Act in that
the Restatement lists the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction as a
discretionary rather than mandatory ground for non-enforcement and
does not allow for non-recognition in cases involving both personal
service (i.e., "tag" jurisdiction) and a "seriously inconvenient
forum."ll 6 The Restatement also differs from the 1962 Act in that
the Restatement allows the enforcing court to look not only to the
public policy "of the State where recognition is sought" but also to
"the public policy of the United States" as a whole-an approach
that is consistent with the 2005 Act." 7
Although these provisions have been set forth in a relatively
linear fashion so as to compare the various approaches, parties
coming to the United States to have a foreign judgment recognized
and enforced find questions relating to substantive law to be very
confusing. Although this discussion has identified a number of
broad-brush similarities between the different approaches, each state
113. Compare 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(13) (providing that the state
court is not required to recognize a foreign country judgment if it is "repugnant to
the public policy"), with 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 4(b)(13) (providing that a
foreign judgment need not be recognized if the cause of action or claim for relief is
repugnant to public policy, but not if the judgment itself is repugnant to public
policy).
114. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(13); 1962 ACT, supra note 67,
§ 4(b); BRAND, supra note 1, at 8-9.
115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(2)(b)-{c),
(e)-(f) (1987)

116. Id. § 482(2)(a), cmt. a, c (1987); see also 2005 ACT, supra note 71,
§ 4(c); 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 4(b) (quoting the same language).
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(2)(d) (1987); see
also 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(3); 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 4(b).
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interprets and implements its law in its own way, which can make it
difficult, if not impossible, for parties to predict whether and to what
extent a particular judgment will be recognized or enforced.
b.

Proceduresin State Court

As difficult as the substantive choice of law analysis may be
in cases involving the recognition or enforcement of a foreign
judgment, procedural questions may be even worse. Indeed, a
considerable amount of confusion exists regarding the procedures
that U.S. courts are to follow in cases involving recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, since neither the 1962 Act nor the
Restatement explicitly describes how such judgments are to be
recognized." 8
Furthermore, neither of the two enactments provides any
detailed guidance on how foreign judgments that have been
recognized are to be enforced.' 19 For example, the 1962 Act merely
indicates that a foreign judgment that has been recognized in a U.S.
court "is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister
state which is entitled to full faith and credit" under the U.S.
Constitution and ancillary legislation,120 while the Restatement
simply states that foreign judgments that are entitled to recognition
in a U.S. court may be enforced "in accordance with the procedure
for enforcement of judgments applicable where enforcement is

sought."'21
In the absence of any controlling legal authority, some courts
operating under the 1962 Act have turned to the 1964 Act
concerning enforcement of judgments from U.S. sister states and
applied the type of simplified procedures (often referred to as
"registration" of a judgment) contemplated in that enactment to cases

118.
RELATIONS

See 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 4; RESTATEMENT
§§ 481-82 (1987); BRAND, supra note 1, at 5.

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN

119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481 cmt. B
(1987) (distinguishing between the recognition and the enforcement of foreign
judgments).
120. 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 3 (discussing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28
U.S.C. § 1738).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481(2) (1987).
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involving judgments from foreign countries.122 However, most
states have decided against that approach and instead require parties
to engage in a full-fledged evidentiary proceeding.123 Jurisdictions
that have adopted a Restatement-based approach to recognition and
enforcement do not appear to have relied on the simplified
enforcement mechanism reflected in the 1964 Act and instead simply
follow standard common law procedures.' 24
The situation is much improved under the 2005 Act, since
that enactment includes specific language regarding the rocedures
to be used to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. 12 Thus, the
2005 Act states that "[i]f recognition of a foreign-country judgment
is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition shall be
raised by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country
judgment." 26 Furthermore, "[i]f recognition of a foreign-country
judgment is sought in a pending action, the issue of recognition may
122. See 1964 ACT, supra note 88, § 23; 1962 ACT, supra note 67; Soc'y of
Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 481-82 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the 1964
Act is applicable in cases involving foreign judgments); Enron (Thrace)
Exploration & Prod. BV v. Clapp, 874 A.2d 561, 565-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005) (using the 1964 Act in situation involving a foreign judgment); Pinilla
v. Harza Eng'g Co., 755 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (using the 1964 Act to
determine how a foreign judgment may be enforced); BRAND, supra note 1, at 5.
The technique of relying on the 1964 Act to construe the 1962 Act has been used
in other contexts, such as the definition of a "penalty." See Java Oil Ltd. v.
Sullivan, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 177, 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Similar approaches have
been used to identify what constitutes proper notice. See Milhoux v. Linder, 902
P.2d 856, 862 (Colo. App. 1995) (using 1964 Act to determine whether mailing a
notice informing defendant of Belgian judgment satisfied requirements in an action
brought under the 1962 Act).
123. See, e.g., Baker & McKenzie Abvokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So.
3d 1109, 1117 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (declining to allow simplified ex parte
procedure under 1964 Act); Genujo Lok Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zom, 943 A.2d
573, 581 (Me. 2008) (requiring evidentiary hearing); BRAND, supra note 1, at 5. If
recognition and enforcement actions are not possible under the simplified
procedures contemplated in the 1964 Act, they may nevertheless be brought as a
common law action. See 1964 Act, supra note 88; Barone v. Barone, No. E201 101014-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1116320, at *1, *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2012)
(allowing a common law action to enforce a Canadian judgment).
124. See, e.g., Maberry v. Maberry, No. M1999-01322-COA-R3-CV, 1999
WL 1072568, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1999) (declining to reach the issue).
125. See 2005 Act, supra note 71, § 7(2).
126. Id. § 6(a).
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be raised by counterclaim, cross-claim, or affirmative defense." 27
Once recognized, a foreign judgment is "enforceable in the same
manner and to the same extent as a judgment rendered in this
state."1 28
Notably, the procedures outlined under the various model
enactments are not exclusive. Parties may still rely on common law
procedures to obtain recognition or enforcement of a foreign
judgment, even in those jurisdictions that have adopted the 1962 Act
or the 2005 Act.1 29 It is also possible for a state that has enacted the
1962 Act to eliminate the Act's procedural shortcomings by adopting
an independently created set of procedural provisions, 13 although
only one state, Florida, appears to have done so to date.13 1
3.

Full Faith and Credit

Once a foreign judgment has been recognized or enforced in
one U.S. state or federal district court, parties may wish to seek
recognition and enforcement elsewhere in the country.' 32 This
process is typically carried out pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and related legislation. 133
Application of full faith and credit is a relatively simple
matter within the federal system, since "[f]ederal law provides for
registration of a final federal judgment in any district and entitles it

127. Id. § 6(b).
128. Id. § 7(2).
129. See Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo. App. 1995) (holding
that foreign judgment may be recognized under the common law doctrine of
comity); Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enters., Ltd., 794 S.W.2d 760, 761
(Tex. 1990) (discussing common law suits); see also 2005 Act, supra note 71;
1962 Act, supra note 67.
130. BRAND, supra note 1, at 5.
131. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.604 (West 2012) (detailing procedures for
recording of judgment as well as notice and enforcement).
132. The need for any parallel enforcement can arise for any one of a variety
of tactical reasons, including insufficient assets in any one jurisdiction.
133. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State."); 1964 Act, supra note 88. The principles of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause are extended to the federal government by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(2013).
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to the same status as in the adjudicating district." 34 Enforcement of
judgments across the state-federal line is also relatively
straightforward, since state courts "are treated as collateral
jurisdictions, with the federal court having no greater or lesser
priority to impose its rules."' 35 Thus, a federal court must give full
faith and credit to a state court judgment just as a state court must
give credit to a federal court judgment.136
However, a certain amount of national variation arises as a
procedural matter, since questions of procedure are governed by state
law regardless of whether the case is seated in state or federal
court. 137 Thus, it has been said that "[e]nforcement measures do not
travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do;
[instead,] such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of
forum law."l 38 Although this issue has seldom been discussed in the
commentary, it is clear that foreign parties will find the intricacies of
U.S. state and federal procedural law daunting.
B.

U.S. Concepts ofPreclusion

Actions to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment are
motivated by two different principles. For example, many parties
134. George, supra note 28, at 423; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2013)
(permitting "a federal judgment rendered in one district to be registered in any
other in the federal system").
135. George, supra note 28, at 423.
136. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S. F., 545 U.S. 323, 338,
347-48 (2005) (holding that the full faith and credit statute precluded further
litigation of takings claims that had been adjudicated in state court); Marrese v.
Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1985) (noting that "a
federal court to look first to state preclusion law in determining the preclusive
effects of a state court judgment"); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980)
("Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to
state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments
emerged would do so."); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1938) (noting
that under the full faith and credit statute, "the judgments and decrees of the
Federal courts in a state are declared to have the same dignity in the courts of that
state as those of its own courts in a like case and under similar circumstances").
137. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 4467; see also George, supra
note 28, at 422 (explaining that those seeking to enforce judgments outside of the
state face differences in local procedures).
138. Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1988).
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bring these actions because they wish to obtain the required relief in
a jurisdiction other than the one which rendered the original
judgment. This phenomenon, which is perhaps the most common
type of enforcement action, is essentially affirmative in nature and is
of primary concern to judgment creditors.
However, parties can also attempt to use a judgment rendered
in one jurisdiction to block subsequent relitigation of the same matter
in another jurisdiction. This phenomenon, which is essentially
defensive in nature, involves the various principles of preclusion.1 39
1.

Choice of Law Concerns

Every legal system in the world recognizes the concept of
preclusion, although the principles are defined and applied somewhat
differently from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 140 For example,
[i]n ... England and Wales, the Netherlands, Spain,
and the United States . . . judgments have issue
preclusive effect. In . . . other countries, however -

Germany, France, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland
- judgments have no issue preclusive effect. When
coupled with the narrow definition of the claim for
purposes of claim preclusion employed in these
countries and the failure to accord settlements claim
preclusive effect, this lack of issue preclusive effect
may leave parties with a fair bit of room to relitigate

139. See Peter Barnett, The Prevention of Abusive Cross-Border ReLitigation, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 943, 944 (2002) (discussing different types of
preclusion).
140. See id. at 953-57 (discussing preclusive principles); Rhonda
Wasserman, TransnationalClass Actions and InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 313, 344-45 (2011) (discussing preclusion internationally).
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matters already adjudicated by changing the theory
upon which they sue or by seeking different relief.141
Although these sorts of differences can make it difficult for
parties to anticipate whether and to what extent a particular claim or
issue will be precluded in the United States, it also means that U.S.
courts are on notice that a conflict of laws analysis may be necessary
in actions relating to recognition and enforcement.
In the
international context, two such analyses must occur. First, the court
must determine whether state or federal law should be used to
represent the so-called "U.S." position, and second, the court must
determine whether U.S. or foreign law governs a particular issue.142
The domestic conflict of laws issue is resolved on principles
similar to those relating to the substantive law of recognition and
enforcement (i.e., the Erie doctrine).143 State courts rely on state
law, and federal courts rely on state or federal law depending on the
type of subject matter jurisdiction that exists.144 Thus, in cases

141. Wasserman, supra note 140, at 344-45 (internal citations omitted).
Although the biggest differences in preclusion arise in the cross-border context,
discrepancies can also arise within a single jurisdiction in countries reflecting
federal or other non-unitary legal structures. The United States provides a prime
example of the types of problems that can arise in these circumstances. Not only
do a number of variations regarding the scope of interjurisdictional preclusion
arise in the interstate context, they also arise in cases crossing over the
federal-state divide. See Stephen B. Burbank, FederalJudgments Law: Sources of
Authority and Sources ofRules, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1551, 1556-87 (1992) (discussing
federal judgments law in state, interjurisdictional, and international cases).
142. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 4473; Wasserman, supra note
140, at 369-78 (describing the preclusion law analysis in Europe); see also Robert
C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70
IOWA L. REv. 53, 56-57 (1984) (discussing the "source of the standards to be used
in determining the issue preclusion effect of a foreign country judgment"); Chao &
Neuhoff, supra note 12, at 159-60 ("Once the court determines that a judgment is
entitled to recognition, it must then determine whose law governs the preclusive
effect that should be accorded to the judgment. Many United States courts apply
either federal or state law . . . Other courts apply the law of the rendering
country ...

.").

143. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (stating that
except in matters governed by the Constitution, the law to be applied is state law).
144. See id.; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 4473.
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involving federal question jurisdiction, courts look to federal law. 145
However, in cases involving diversity jurisdiction, courts look to the
law of the state in which the federal court sits. 14 6
Once the question of state versus federal law has been
determined, the court must decide whether to apply the preclusive
principles used in the country that rendered the judgment or those
that are used in the United States. Here, no standard approach exists.
Instead,
[t]hree major models have been proposed. One model
approaches domestic views of full faith and credit,
incorporating the res judicata rules of the court that
entered judgment. A second model relies on the
domestic res judicata rules of the court that entertains
the second action. The third would create special res
judicata rules to account for the special circumstances
presented by international judgments. 147
Each of these approaches has merit. Looking to the law of
the rendering court "has the obvious advantages of protecting the
procedural and substantive interests of the first forum and promoting
predictability for the parties," while relying on the law of the
enforcing court "may serve important domestic interests." 48
However, the notion of creating a special rule for foreign judgments
that "strikes a middle ground" between the United States' uniquely
"broad domestic views [regarding preclusion] and the ordinarily
narrower views of other countries" has been discussed for a number
of years as providing an appropriate compromise position.149
145. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 4473; see Int'l Nutrition Co.
v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1328-30 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing
patent law); Egan v. Weiss, 119 F.3d 106, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing
immigration law); see also Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 782-84 (6th Cir.
2007) (stating that "to determine whether a judgment issued by a court of a foreign
country is entitled to preclusive effect, the threshold inquiry is whether the case
arises under federal question or diversity jurisdiction").
146. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 4473.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald D. Trautman, Recognition
of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REv.
1601 (1968)).
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Scope of Preclusion

Once the conflict of laws concerns have been resolved, courts
need to identify which principle of preclusion is at issue and what the
scope of that principle is. 50 Courts in the United States distinguish
between two different concerns. The first involves claim preclusion,
also known as the principle of resjudicata.'5 ' This concept "bars the
relitigation of a claim that was, or should have been, raised in the
first lawsuit as long as the first lawsuit ended in a valid final
judgment on the merits" and "requires that both the plaintiff and the
defendant be identical in both suits." 1 52 Matters relating to claim
preclusion typically "arise when a party has unsuccessfully litigated
a claim in the first lawsuit and later attempts to bring a different,
related claim in a subsequent lawsuit."' 53
The second concept, known as issue preclusion or collateral
estoppel, "does not bar the entire claim [in the second action] but
simply precludes relitigating a discrete issue."154 The only time that
parties to a second suit "are barred from challenging the resolution in
the first litigation" is when "the issue was actually litigated and
decided in the first suit, resolution of the issue was essential to the
result, and there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate."15 5

150. See Barnett, supra note 142, at 944 (classifying preclusion in three
ways, based on the prevention of contradictory claims, reassertion of successful
claims, and abuse of process).
151. See Max Minzner, Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and
ProceduralDue Process,2010 BYU L. REv. 597, 600-01 (2010).
152. Id. (citation omitted); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892
(2008) ("Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses
'successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the
claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit."' (citing New Hampshire v. Maine,
532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)).
153. Minzner, supra note 151, at 601 (citation omitted).
154. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27); see also
Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892 (noting "[i]ssue preclusion ... bars 'successive litigation
of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court
determination essential to the prior judgment,' even if the issue recurs in the
context of a different claim" (citing New Hampshire,532 U.S. at 748-49)).
155. Minzner, supra note 151, at 601 (citation omitted).
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However, issue preclusion differs from claim preclusion in that the
parties do not need to be identical for issue preclusion to arise. 156
Although a detailed analysis of preclusion issues is beyond
the scope of the current discussion, the U.S. Supreme Court has
handed down a number of opinions over the last ten years that
"reaffirm[ ] the due process limitations on nonparty preclusion." 5 7
The most recent of these decisions, Taylor v. Sturgell, reiterated "the
general rule that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has
not been made a party by service of process."ss Taylor identified
six situations in which claim and issue preclusion apply, although the
Court explicitly noted that this list was non-exclusive.' 59 Therefore,
in the United States, a non-party may not relitigate a matter if he or
she (1) agreed to be bound by the earlier decision; (2) has a certain
type of "pre-existing 'substantive legal relationship' . . . [with] a

party to the judgment," such as that existing between "preceding and
succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and
assignor"; (3) has been adequately represented by an actual party to
the suit, including representation in a class action; (4) has assumed
control over the earlier litigation; (5) acts as "the designated
representative of a person who was a party to the prior adjudication;"
or (6) falls within certain statutory schemes, such as "bankruptcy and
probate proceedings, and quo warranto actions or other suits that,
'under [the governing] law, [may] be brought only on behalf of the
60

public at large."'

As this discussion shows, parties attempting to rely on the
preclusive effect of a foreign judgment in the United States face
numerous uncertainties and ambiguities. Not only is it impossible to
predict which law will apply under a conflict of laws analysis, but it
is also entirely unclear what the scope of preclusion will be once the
This situation is highly
substantive law has been identified.

156. See id. (citation omitted).
157. Id. at 597; see also Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891-93; New Hampshire, 532
U.S. at 748.
158. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893, 904 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (invalidating the concept of "virtual representation").
159. Id. at 893 n.6.
160. Id. at 893-95 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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problematic and will only become more pressing as recognition
actions become more frequent across the United States.1 6 1

III.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

As the preceding discussion shows, the law regarding
enforcement and recognition of judgments in the United States is
extremely convoluted. As a result, it is nearly impossible for
litigants to anticipate either the procedural or substantive principles
that will govern in any particular case. Although it may be relatively
easy for a U.S. lawyer to identify the relevant legal standards once a
particular venue is chosen,1 62 it is not always clear where an action to
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment can or will be brought.
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult for foreign parties to
understand the complex web of constitutional, statutory, and
common law that arises as a matter of state and federal law. Indeed,
the current state of affairs appears entirely contrary to statements by
the United States Supreme Court that "[i]n our dealings with the
outside world the United States speaks with one voice and acts as
one, unembarrassed by the complications as to domestic issues
which are inherent in the distribution of political power between the
national government and the individual states."' 63
While parties can limit the amount of unpredictability
inherent in an enforcement action by adopting a choice of court
agreement, that method is not entirely foolproof, for although COCA
provides a relatively standard framework for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments arising out of an exclusive choice
COCA is not yet in force and may never
of court agreement,
achieve the kind of widespread adherence that its proponents
161. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
162. This may be the perspective taken by commentators who suggest that
the law relating to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United
States is "neither as diffuse nor as complicated as many fear." Stewart, supra note
11, at 180.
163. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also ALI, supra note 22, at 1-2 (discussing Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964)).
164. See COCA, supra note 4, arts. 8-9.
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anticipate. 165 Furthermore, COCA is relatively limited in the types
of disputes to which it applies.1 66
Experts in law and economics have identified a number of
difficulties that can arise as a result of unpredictability and nonuniform application of law.167 The most well-known problems relate
to the increased costs and delays that arise as a result of legal
uncertainty. However, other procedural and substantive concerns
become apparent upon closer examination.
A.

ProceduralConcerns

The U.S. approach to recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments gives rise to a number of procedural concerns, including
"reduced access to justice, negative repercussions for foreign
relations, and underregulation of transnational activity." 68 Problems
with access to justice are perhaps the most visible and can arise in a
variety of ways. For example, some parties may fail to bring an
action for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment

165. Id.; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
166. See COCA, supra note 4, arts. 1-2 (outlining the scope of COCA's
application); see also supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
167. See The Honourable J.J. Spigelman, Chief Justice of New South Wales,
Address at the 16th Inter-Pacific Bar Association Conference: Transaction Costs
and International Litigation (May 2, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/SupremeCourt/ll_sc.nsf/vwPrintl/SCO_s
pigelmanO2O5O6) (discussing transaction costs in transnational litigation); see also
Rebecca Golbert, The Global Dimension of the CurrentEconomic Crisis and the
Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 11 NEV. L.J. 502, 503 (2011) (noting
the risks associated with transnational litigation, including "monetary costs,
duration of time, representation in foreign courts, unpredictability of outcome,
problems of enforcement, and long-term impact to business relationships"); Yaad
Rotem, The Problem of Selective or Sporadic Recognition: A New Economic
Rationalefor the Law ofForeign Country Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 505, 508
(2010) (explaining differing incentives that affect countries' willingness to
recognize foreign judgments).
168. Whytock, supra note 41, at 483.
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because it is not cost-effective to do so. 169 This phenomenon
violates the fundamental concept that justice must be available to all
persons, not only the wealthy. 0
Other parties may hesitate to bring an action to recognize or
enforce a foreign judgment in the United States because of concerns
about a potential bias against foreign litigants.1 7 ' This is not a novel
issue, since several commentators have suggested that the current
U.S. approach to recognition and enforcement may be tilted in favor

169. See Edward C.Y. Lau, Update on the Hague Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Judgments, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP.
L. 13, 24 (2000) ("[I]f the award is reduced by the enforcing court, the award
could be so small as to not make it worthwhile to have recognition
enforced .... ); Whytock & Robertson, supra note 12, at 1481-88 (discussing the
gap in transnational access to justice and the costs of adversarial proceedings).
Some lawyers take the view that it is not worthwhile bringing an enforcement
action in the United States if the judgment involves less than $100,000. This
strategy is based on estimates regarding both various fixed costs (such as filing and
translation fees) and hourly attorneys' fees, which can add up very quickly. See
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 374-479 (Paul Hopkins
ed., 2006); Houston Putnam Lowry, Enforcing Foreign Judgments, GP SOLO,
Apr.-May 2011, at 34 (explaining the extensive process to secure enforcement of a
foreign judgment). Attorneys' fees are of particular interest to non-U.S. parties
because the American rule on costs means each party bears its own attorneys' fees
and costs, unlike the approach used in most other jurisdictions. See Elizabeth J.
Elias, Note, Nearly Toothless: Why the SPEECH Act is Mostly Bark, with Little
Bite, 40 HOFSTRA L. REv. 235, 256 (2011) (noting that the SPEECH Act has a
provision reversing attorneys' fees). In most countries, the losing party is required
to pay the prevailing party's fees as an incentive to avoid unmeritorious litigation.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American
Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98
CORNELL L. REv. 327, 335-39 (2013) (contrasting the American rule with the
English rule on fees).
170. See Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 869, 872-91 (2009) (outlining barriers to justice and discussing
the costs of such limitations); see also Gene Nichol, State Budget Challenges and
the Scourge of Poverty, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 77 (2012) (noting
the United States has significant problems living up to promises regarding equal
justice).
171. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 12, at 1450 (noting that the
foreign judicial adequacy standard of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
"lenient" whereas "the judgment enforcement doctrine's standard is stricter").
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of defendants, who are predominantly U.S. parties.172 However, any
pro-forum bias would be highly problematic as both a matter of law
and policy, given that foreign nationals are considered "persons"
within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, hold
certain constitutional rights relating to due process and equal
treatment under the law. 3 However, it is unclear whether and to
what extent a constitutional challenge to these procedures could be
mounted, Aiven recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to
standing.
Giving U.S. parties preferential treatment in actions to
recognize and enforce foreign judgments not only gives rise to
constitutional concerns, it also creates difficulties on the foreign
relations front.'7 5 Furthermore, certain aspects of U.S. enforcement

172. See id. (explaining that the current system may deny plaintiffs
meaningful access to justice); see also Brand, supra note 6, at 82 (discussing the
rationale behind the current system).
173. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Or., 548 U.S. 331, 350 (2006) ("A foreign
national detained on suspicion of crime . . . enjoys under our system the

protections of the Due Process Clause."); Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619-20
(1992) (assuming, without deciding, that "a foreign state is a 'person' for the
purposes of the Due Process Clause"); Soci6td Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale
v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 565 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the "major United States
interest ... in fair and equal treatment of litigants" and noting the need to avoid
"unacceptable asymmetries" between foreign and domestic litigants (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 553-54 & n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing how a "pro-forum bias is likely to creep
into" judicial analyses); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 (1969)
(noting that the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause apply to
discriminatory tax burdens on foreign sources); Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and
the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 801, 808 (2013) (suggesting that under the
Constitution, "persons" and "the people" identify a broad class of individuals "that
would necessarily encompass aliens").
174. For example, a recent constitutional challenge to a statute that
distinguishes between "United States persons" and others failed due to problems
associated with the standing of the parties. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 n.1 (2013) ("The term 'United States person' includes
citizens of the United States, aliens admitted for permanent residence, and certain
associations and coporations."). Similar problems could arise in cases involving
challenges to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. See id. at
1146-47 (articulating the requirements for standing under Article III).
175. See Colloquium, supra note 31; Brand, supra note 6, at 82; Whytock &
Robertson, supra note 12, at 1450. Indeed, foreign states and litigants already find
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practice could be seen as an unacceptable form of extraterritorial
policymaking by U.S. courts to the extent that U.S. courts are
permitted or required to consider the propriety of foreign judgments
from the perspective of U.S. principles of due process.' 7 6
Finally, unnecessarily complex procedures relating to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments could lead to
underregulation of certain transnational legal injuries.1 77 Crossborder regulation is an extremely difficult issue to address, given the
absence of a single political actor with jurisdiction over all interested
parties, and a particularly severe or unpredictable national approach
to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments can lead to
regulatory 7 aps and the concomitant under-deterrence of the harmful
behavior.1

a number of U.S. procedural practices highly objectionable. See Whytock &
Robertson, supra note 12, at 1450 (discussing forum non conveniens).
176. See Carodine,supra note 26, at 1246 (opposing "any conception of due
process that requires courts to engage in foreign policymaking"); see also Luthin,
supra note 11, at 132-34 (noting the reluctance of most courts to "engage in an
examination of the procedures of courts that have a justice system that generally
comports with our notions of fundamental fairness").
177. See Whytock, supra note 41, at 483 (discussing the effects of
transnational forum shopping).
178. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, TransnationalRegulatory Litigation, 46 VA.
J. INT'L L. 251, 261 (2006); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate LitigationAcross the
Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1, 13
(2009); S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S.
Class Action Have a New Analogue?, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 899, 902, 915-18
(2012) [hereinafter Strong, Regulatory Litigation].
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Substantive Concerns

Procedural issues are not the only kind of problem that can
arise in the context of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. A number of substantive concerns also exist. For
example, the lack of uniformity inherent in the U.S. enforcement
regime means that parties are largely unable to anticipate which
substantive principles of law will apply in any given situation. This
unpredictability arises with respect to both the standards relating to
recognition and enforcement as well as the scope of preclusion.
However, parties seeking to have a foreign judgment
recognized or enforced face an even greater problem than legal
uncertainty. Over the last several years, a significant number of U.S.
states have adopted (or have attempted to adopt) legislation limiting
courts' ability to rely on anything other than U.S. state or federal
law, primarily as a means of blocking the influence of Shari'a law in
the domestic U.S. context. 179 The best known of these efforts was
the Oklahoma Save Our State amendment,' 80 but similar proposals
have been made in thirty-two other U.S. states, with five such laws
having been successfully enacted.'8 ' Although the Oklahoma state
179. See Michael Kirkland, Under the U.S. Supreme Court: Islamic Law in
U.S. Courts, UPI (May 19, 2013), http://www.upi.com/Top News/US/2013/05/19/
Under-the-US-Supreme-Court-Islamic-law-in-US-courts/UPI-64481368948600/
(discussing legislation introduced in thirty-two states that would have limited
consideration of foreign or religious laws in state court decisions).
180. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1125-33 (10th Cir. 2012)
(upholding a preliminary injunction against certification of "Save Our State"
amendment election results); Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1207 (W.D.
Okla. 2013) (permanently enjoining certification of election results); John R.
Crook, Tenth Circuit Upholds Injunction Barring Oklahoma Anti-Sharia, AntiInternationalLaw ConstitutionalAmendment, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 365-66
(2012) (discussing the passage of the "Save Our State" amendment and the Awad
decision); John T. Parry, Oklahoma's Save Our State Amendment and the Conflict
of Laws, 65 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 1 (2012) (explaining the history of the Awad
decision).
181. See Aaron Fellmeth, US. State Legislation to Limit Use of
International and Foreign Law, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 107-17 (2012)
(describing various proposed federal and state measures limiting consideration of
foreign sources of law); David L. Nersessian, How Legislative Bans on Foreign
and InternationalLaw Obstruct the Practiceand Regulation ofAmerican Lawyers,
44 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1647, 1652-53 (2012) (discussing the negative impact of laws
limiting consideration of foreign law).
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amendment was judicially enjoined in 2012,182 that decision turned
on First Amendment principles, and it is possible that some of these
laws will be upheld if they are drafted in a way that does not
disapprove of or disadvantage the free exercise of religion. 183
Although each state frames its law slightly differently, many of these
provisions are quite broad and could effectively prohibit the
recorition or enforcement of a foreign judgment based on foreign
law. 84 No distinction is made for judgments arising out of courts
whose systems of justice are beyond any possible reproach, thereby
creating a universal ban on the recognition of enforcement of foreign
judgments in U.S. courts unless the foreign court applied U.S. state
or federal law. 85 Notably, several of these laws would also prohibit
the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by tribal
courts from any of the over 500 federally recognized Native
American nations.' 86
Most commentators have focused on the effect these
provisions would have in state courts.' 8 7 However, these substantive
182. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1125-33 (analyzing whether a preliminary
injunction was appropriate); Crook, supra note 180, at 365.
183. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Jay Wexler, Government Disapproval of
Religion, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REv. 119, 145 (2013) (commenting that the Oklahoma
amendment imposed "real legal disability upon the plaintiff and other Muslims by
prohibiting them from, for instance, relying on their religion's teachings in
Oklahoma courts in cases involving probate matters or religious expression").
184. See Fellmeth, supra note 181, at 107 (discussing a proposed Iowa bill
barring use of foreign precendent or case law in court decisions and a Utah bill
barring enforcement of foreign judgments when a person's constitutional rights are
violated).
185. Id.; see also Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting that to question the legitimacy of the English legal system "borders
on the risible").
186. There are currently 565 federally recognized Native American nations,
each with their own legal system. See Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act
of 1994, 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1 (2013); Tribal Directory, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
AFFAIRS,
http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OIS/Tribal
INTERIOR, INDIAN
GovernmentServices/TribalDirectory/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2013); Peacemaking
INDIAN
LAW
LIBRARY,
Resolution,
NAT'L
and
Conflict
http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/peacemaking.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
187. See Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma and Beyond:
Understanding the Wave of State Anti-TransnationalLaw Initiatives, 87 IND. L.J.
SuPP. 1, 9-15 (2011); Fellmeth, supra note 181, at 113-17; Penny M. Venetis, The
Unconstitutionalityof Oklahoma's SQ 755 and Other ProvisionsLike It That Bar
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standards would also apply in federal courts hearing cases in
diversity, since the Erie doctrine requires federal courts to look to
state rather than federal law to determine issues of substance in those
circumstances. 8 8
Laws like the Oklahoma Save Our State provision are
problematic in a variety of ways.' 89 Not only does this sort of
legislation threaten judicial independence with respect to
enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments, but it also
challenges various constitutional principles relating to the role of the
federal government in international and foreign affairs.' 90 Aside
from the legal and policy issues, these sorts of isolationist measures
give rise to certain practical problems. For example, these sorts of
enactments increase the likelihood that foreign states will refuse to
recognize or enforce judgments rendered by U.S. courts and limit the
contractual freedom of U.S. business and individuals.191 While most
commentators believe that these provisions violate the U.S.
Constitution and will therefore be struck,192 the future of these laws
remains unclear.

IV.

SOLUTION - THE ALI PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE

As the preceding discussion shows, relying on state law to
govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments creates
numerous procedural and substantive problems. As a result, the best
way to proceed may very well be to replace the piecemeal approach

State Courts From Considering International Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 189,
201-16 (2011).
188. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938); BRAND,
supra note 1, at 4. For additional discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra notes
50-66 and accompanying text.
189. See Davis & Kalb, supra note 187, at 14-15.
190. See id. Some people view the statutes as upholding states' rights
whereas other observers believe the provisions violate the Supremacy Clause. See
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Davis & Kalb, supra note 187, at 9-12; Parry, supra
note 180, at 37.
191. See Davis & Kalb, supra note 187, at 12-15.
192. See, e.g., id. at 13 (arguing that the statutes violate the Constitution);
Venetis, supra note 187, at 215-17 (discussing numerous grounds under which the
statutes are unconstitutional).
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that is currently in place with a uniform federal statute.1 93 Indeed,
this was the view of the ALI when it drafted the ALI Proposed
Statute in 2005.194 This provision, if adopted, would preempt state
legislation in this area of law and standardize the procedural and
substantive standards relating to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in the United States.
The ALI's approach is somewhat controversial, given that a
number of authorities believe that individual U.S. states have
primary, if not exclusive, competence over matters relating to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. However, other
experts suggest that the influence of state law in this field arose as a
historical accident and ceding control over such matters to the
federal government would be more in keeping with the separation of
powers principles set forth in the U.S. Constitution.195 Indeed, the
federal government was universally considered to be the primary
actor in this field all the way up until 1926, when the New York
Court of Appeals claimed competence for itself over enforcement
issues because "the question is one of private rather than public
international law, of private right rather than public relations."' 96
Since then, states have taken an increasingly large role for

193. See McFarland,supra note 22, at 67-68; Silberman, Maier, supra note
37, at 1432-37; von Mehren, Drafting,supra note 12, at 200. Some analysts have
reached this conclusion by applying game theory and other abstract analytical
models. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 802-11; Rotem, supra note 167, at 508-09;
Whincop, supra note 12, at 416; Susan L. Stevens, Note, Commanding
InternationalJudicialRespect: Reciprocity and the Recognition and Enforcement
of ForeignJudgments, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 135-58 (2002);
see also Robert B. Adieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New
Federalism: Lessons From Coordination,73 Mo. L. REv. 1185, 1215 (2008).
194. See ALI, supra note 22; Luthin, supra note 11, at 145.
195. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 73-74 (2011)
(prepared statement of Hon. Steve Cohen, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary)
(discussing ALI, supra note 22, at 2-3); Vaughan Black, A Canada-U.S. Full
Faith and Credit Clause?, 18 Sw. J. INT'L L. 595, 607-08 (2012); Jack L.
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1635 (1997); McFarland, supra note 22, at 67-68.
196. Johnson v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123
(N.Y. 1926).
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themselves in matters of recognition and enforcement, albeit with
very little critical analysis by either courts or commentators.' 97
The ALI Proposed Statute sidesteps these sorts of
constitutional debates by giving state and federal courts concurrent
jurisdiction over the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.19 8
Given the relative paucity of discussion about
federalism concerns by both the ALI and other authorities, this
Article will leave that analysis to another day. Instead, the focus
here is on determining whether and to what extent the ALI Proposed
Statute addresses the various substantive and procedural problems
described earlier in this Article.1 9 9
The ALI Proposed Statute contains thirteen separate
sections. 200 Each is discussed in turn below.
A.

Section 1 - Scope

The ALI Proposed Statute begins by describing its scope of
application.20 1
Like the 1962 Act, the 2005 Act, and the
Restatement, the ALI Proposed Statute focuses primarily on foreign
money judgments that do not arise out of domestic matters,
bankruptcy, or ongoing arbitrations.202
Most of these exclusions give rise to few concerns. For
example, insolvency203 and family law204 both see a great deal of
197. See ALI, supra note 22, at 2-3.
198. See id. at 4. For additional discussion of removal and concurrent
jurisdiction, see infra notes 414-415 and accompanying text.
199. See ALI, supra note 22, at 29-149 (providing detailed comments and
reporters' notes); Bellinger Testimony, supra note 27, at 65 (discussing
improvements to the ALI Proposed Statute).
200. See ALI, supra note 22, at 29-149.
201. See id. § 1, at 29-35.
202. See id. § 1, at 29; 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 3; 1962 ACT, supra note
67, § 3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481 (1987). However,
judgments relating to succession are covered by the proposed statute. See ALI,
supra note 22, § 1 cmt. b, at 30.
203. See ADLER, supra note 1, at 1-2 (explaining that Chapter 15 is a
"nearly verbatim adoption" of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which is an
"international effort to deal with cross-border insolvency issues"); BUFFORD ET
AL., supra note 1, at 53-75 (discussing various international treaties concerning
invsolvency); see also ALI, supra note 22, § 1 n.3(b), at 35 (noting bankruptcy has
received special treatment from both courts and scholarly writing).
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international coordination through other measures. Arbitration is
also subject to other means by which a foreign arbitral award can be
effectively recognized and enforced internationally. 20 5 However,
some problems could arise in the arbitral realm to the extent that the
ALI allows a foreign judgment confirming an arbitral award to be
recognized and enforced under the ALI Proposed Statute. 206
Although there is nothing objectionable about recognizing or
enforcing such judgments per se, some questions exist as to whether
the process of obtaining a judgment on an arbitral award causes the
award to "merge" into the judgment and which country's law should
decide that issue.2 07 Given these difficulties, caution should be
exercised when considering this aspect of the proposed statute.20 8
204. See ALI, supra note 22, § I reporters' note 3(a), at 34 (noting that a
number of U.S. statutes and international treaties regulate aspects of family law
related issues, such as international child abduction, adoption, and support); see
also supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (mentioning the International
Support Enforcement Act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act as examples of
subject-specific statutes involving domestic relations).
205. See BORN, supra note 19, at 76-78 (discussing how international
arbitral awards are enforced under international agreements such as the New York
Convention); New York Convention, supra note 21 (applying to arbitral awards
made outside of the state where recognition and enforcement is sought); Panama
Convention, supra note 21 (delineating international commercial arbitration
agreement between members of the Organization of American States).
206. See ALI, supra note 22, § 1(a)(iii), cmt. c(3), at 29, 31. Sometimes a
party may be unable to confirm a foreign arbitral award (because of time
limitations, for example), but may be able to enforce a foreign judgment on the
award. See Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v.
Navimpex Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a
French arbitration decree conferring "exequatur" was a functional equivalent of a
judgment awarding sums specified and thus was enforceable).
207. See Richard M. Mosk & Ryan D. Nelson, The Effects of Confirming
and Vacating an International Arbitration Award on Enforcement in Foreign
Jurisdictions,18 J. INT'L ARB. 463, 463-71 (2001).
208. The ALI appears to hold some misconceptions about the nature and
practice of international commercial arbitration. For example, the reporters' notes
suggest that the annulment of an arbitral award at the place where the award was
rendered is problematic under the various treaties governing arbitration, when in
fact such a possibility is expressly contemplated by the relevant treaties and poses
no absolute barrier to the enforcement of the award in other jurisdictions. See New
York Convention, supra note 21, art. V(1)(e); Panama Convention, supra note 21,
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Despite this minor concern, the ALI Proposed Statute is
clearly superior to existing law, since the ALI allows recognition and
enforcement of a number of matters that are not addressed in
previous enactments. 209 For example, the ALI Proposed Statute
covers recognition and enforcement of both injunctions and various
types of declaratory relief, unlike the Restatement or the earlier
model acts.210 Furthermore, "[j]udgments for civil damages given in
a penal proceeding, if otherwise entitled to recognition and
enforcement, come within" the scope of the ALI Proposed Statute,
but such judgments fall outside both the 1962 Act and the 2005
Act.
Some types of admiralty and maritime matters also fall
within the terms of the ALI Proposed Statute. 2 12
B.

Section 2 - GeneralProvisionson Recognition and
Enforcement

Judgments that fall within the scope of the ALI Proposed
Statute are to be enforced in accordance with the terms of the statute,
regardless of whether the action is brought in state or federal
21
court.213 Once enacted, the ALI Proposed Statute would therefore
supersede state legislation in this area of law, including statutes
based on the 1962 Act and the 2005 Act.2 14
The ALI Proposed Statute reflects a pro-enforcement bias
that eliminates the possibility of any merit-based review of the

art. 5(1)(e); ALI, supra note 22, § 1 reporters' note 2(b), at 33; STRONG, supra note
1, at 79-82.
209. See ALI, supra note 22, § 1 cmt. b, at 30; see also 2005 ACT, supra
note 71; 1962 ACT, supra note 67.
210. See ALI, supra note 22, § I cmt. b, at 30 (discussing the scope of the
proposed statute's coverage, including judgments granting injunctive or
declaratory relief); supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
211. ALI, supra note 22, § 1 reporters' note 1, at 32; see also 2005 ACT,
supra note 71, § 3(b); 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 1(2).
212. See ALI, supra note 22, § 1 reporters' note 2(a), at 31-32.
213. See id. § 2, cmt. a, at 35-36, 36.
214. See id. § 2, cmt. a, at 35-36; see also 2005 ACT, supra note 71; 1962
ACT, supra note 67.
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foreign judgment.215 Although the ALI Proposed Statute operates in
a manner reminiscent of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, the two mechanisms are not identical.2 1 6
Most judgments falling under the terms of the ALI Proposed
Statute are subject to a mandatory duty of enforcement and
recognition.217 However, "[j]udgments for taxes, fines, and penalties
may [only] be recognized and enforced" under the ALI Proposed
Statute on a discretionary basis.2 18 While this approach introduces a
degree of uncertainty, it is also more expansive than previous
enactments, since the ALI allows U.S. courts to enforce judgments
of this type for the first time, provided that they are non-penal in
nature.21
However, the ALI keeps concerns about excessive
uncertainty and undue expansiveness in check by suggesting that
U.S. courts should only enforce these types of judgments on a

reciprocal basis. 220
Declaratory judgments and orders for injunctive or similar
relief are also only enforceable on a discretionary basis. 221 Although
the element of discretion makes enforcement somewhat difficult to
predict, the ALI believed it important to find a way to support certain
measures, such as "Mareva injunctions" (freezing orders), that are
215. See ALI, supra note 22, § 2 cmt. d, at 37; see also id.§ 5 cmt. c, at 59,
reporters' note 2, at 69-70. Among other things, parties cannot raise defenses
based on claims that U.S. courts would have come to a different conclusion about
the choice of operative law or that the foreign court chose and misapplied U.S.
law. See id. § 2 cmt. e, at 37. However, failure to comply with a valid choice of
law clause could lead to non-enforcement as a matter of public policy. See id.
216. CompareU.S. CONST. art. IV, §l (requiring that full faith and credit be
given by a state to all other states), with ALI, supra note 22, § 2 cmt. c, at 36-37
(discussing interstate cooperation). For example, the ALI Proposed Statute
includes a general public policy defense, whereas the Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1; ALI, supra note 22, § 2 cmt. c, at 37.
217. See ALI, supra note 22, § 2 cmt. f, at 38.
218. Id. § 2 cmt. f, at 35; see also id. § 2 reporters' note 1, at 39-41
(reporters' note 2(1)).
219. See id. § 2 cmt. f, at 38; see also supra notes 70, 75 and accompanying
text.
220. See ALI, supra note 22, § 2 cmt. f, at 38 (stating "if a foreign state
enforces tax judgments or administrative orders issued in the United States, a court
in the United States correspondingly may recognize and enforcement judgments or
orders of that state"); see also infra notes 395-412 and accompanying text.
221. See ALI, supra note 22, § 2, at 35.
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used by foreign courts to increase the effective enforcement of
However, the ALI anticipates that
money judgments.222
"interpretation of foreign-court injunctions, and particularly of their
intended territorial scope, will require special care." 223
Although the ALI Proposed Statute is pro-enforcement, it
avoids an overly permissive attitude toward the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment by indicating that an action must
be brought "within 10 years from the time the judgment becomes
enforceable in the rendering state, or in the event of an appeal, from
the time when the judgment is no longer subject to ordinary forms of
review in the state of origin." 224 Actions may be brought while an
appeal is pending.22 5
The ALI Proposed Statute is not the first time a limitations
period has been adopted in this area of law. 22 6 However, the ALI is
somewhat unusual in that it does not refer to the limitations period in
the state where the judgment was originally rendered.2 27
Together, Sections 1 and 2 of the ALI Proposed Statute
illustrate a number of key differences between the ALI's approach to
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and existing
law.2 28 The innovations appear to be well balanced, for although the
ALI clearly expands the number and type of judgments that are
eligible for recognition and enforcement and allows for a certain
222. See id. § 2 cmt. g, at 38-39; see also David Capper, The Need for
Mareva Injunctions Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2161, 2162 (2005) ("A
Mareva injunction is an interlocutory (normally ex parte) injunction restraining a
defendant in civil litigation from disposing of assets so as to render itself judgment
proof. It operates in personam against the defendant.").
223. ALI, supra note 22, reporters' note 2(2), at 42. Special procedures are
used in these cases. See id. § 2 cmt. g, at 39; see also infra notes 447-478 and
accompanying text.
224. ALL, supra note 22, § 2(c), at 35-36.
225. See id. § 2 cmt. h, at 39. Both the 2005 and 1962 Acts allow a stay of
proceedings pending an appeal in the foreign court. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71,
§ 8; 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 6.
226. The 2005 Act requires enforcement actions to be brought either during
the time the judgment is in effect in the home jurisdiction or within fifteen years of
the time the judgment became effective in that state, whichever is earlier. 2005
ACT, supra note 71, § 9; see also ALI, supra note 22, § 2 reporters' note 3, at 43.
227. Historically, U.S. courts have typically declined enforcement if a
foreign judgment is outside the limitations period in the sending state. See ALI,
supra note 22, § 2 reporters' note 3, at 42.
228. See id. § 2 reporters' note 3, at 29-43.

Winter 2014]

FOREIGNJUDGMENTS IN U.S. COURTS

99

amount of judicial discretion (thereby introducing an element of
uncertainty), the proposed statute also establishes clear boundaries
and predictability through the use of an explicit limitations period
and reciprocity requirement. This new approach would seem highly
beneficial to U.S. parties and interests, since it takes into account the
realities of contemporary commercial practice (such as the ability of
potential judgment debtors to hide their assets quickly and efficiently
through instantaneous electronic transfers) and minimizes the need
for U.S. parties (who may have obtained declaratory relief in a
foreign action) to relitigate a matter that has already been adjudicated
in their favor.
C.

Section 3 - Effect of a ForeignJudgment

Foreign judgments that meet the standards outlined in the
ALI Proposed Statute are not only entitled to recognition and
enforcement of a judgment with respect to issues of liability but also
with respect to damages, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and other
sorts of permissible relief.229 This feature does not appear in either
the 1962 Act or the 2005 Act, although it is largely analogous to the
approach taken under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.230 If damages are payable in a foreign currency, then
the U.S. court may order payment either in that currency or in U.S.
dollars.23 1

229. See id. § 3(a), at 43.
230. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1; ALI, supra note 22, § 3 cmt. a, at 45; see
also Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir.
1971); 2005 ACT, supra note 71; 1962 ACT, supra note 67.
231. See ALI, supra note 22, § 3(a), at 43-44 ("If the foreign judgment
orders payment in a foreign currency, a court in the United States may order
payment in that currency or in United States dollars . . . ."). The conversion rate
would reflect the time of the entry of judgment of enforcement, similar to other
enactments. See id. § 3 cmt. b, at 45 (discussing exchange rate calculations); see
also U.C.C. § 3-107 (2012); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 27(b) (McKinney 2013). This issue
was subject to a number of discrepancies under state law. See ALI, supra note 22,
§ 3 cmt. a, at 45, cmt. c, at 45-46 (citing Semportex Ltd., 453 F.2d at 443).
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Default judgments may be recognized and enforced under the
ALI Proposed Statute in much the same way as judgments that have
been fully contested.2 32 The only difference is that recognition and
enforcement of a default judgment is only proper so long as
(i) the rendering court had jurisdiction over the
defendant in accordance with the law of the state or
origin of the judgment; (ii) the defendant was served
with initiating process in accordance with the law of
the state of origin; and (iii) the rendering court had
jurisdiction over the defendant on a basis not
unacceptable to the United States under §6 of [the
ALI Proposed Statute].2 3 3
This approach allows judgment debtors under a default
judgment to contest enforcement and recognition in the United States
on the grounds of U.S. public policy or other criteria defined in the
ALI Proposed Statute.23
The ALI's approach to default judgments is a significant
improvement over the 2005 Act and the 1962 Act, which are largely
silent regarding this issue.235 Not only does the ALI Proposed
Statute specifically identify the circumstances in which a default
judgment can be recognized and enforced, but the formulation is also
designed to make sure that the default judgment debtor has the
opportunity to raise all defenses that would be persuasive to a U.S.
court in a contested hearing.

232. See ALI, supra note 22, § 3 cmt. c, at 45-46 (discussing defendant's
ability to challenge enforcement of a default judgment).
233. Id. § 3(b), at 44; see also infra notes 269-394 and accompanying text
(discussing Sections 5 and 6 of the ALI Proposed Statute).
234. See ALI, supra note 22, § 3 cmt. c, at 45-46; see also Ackermann v.
Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 842 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a foreign default judgment
can be challenged by a public policy defense); infra notes 269-394 and
accompanying text.
235. References to non-appearance are minimal in the two model acts. See
2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 5(a)(2) (stating a foreign judgment cannot be refused
recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if the defendant appeared voluntarily);
1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 5(a)(2) (same).
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This section of the ALI Proposed Statute also introduces
issues relating to the burden of proof.236 For example, the party
resisting recognition or enforcement bears the initial burden of
challenging the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment. 237
If a credible challenge is raised, then the party relying on the
judgment must show that the original court had jurisdiction and
complied with all necessary due process requirements.2 3 8 However,
defaulting in the U.S. court does not result in an automatic victory
for the party seeking enforcement or recognition. Instead, the party
relying on the judgment must make the necessary showing relating to
the jurisdiction of the rendering court even if the party against whom
the judgment is brought does not appear in the U.S. court.23 9
Although most authority in this field focuses on recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment that has been rendered after a
contested or default proceeding, it is also possible for parties to seek
recognition of a judgment dismissing the dispute. 240 According to
the ALI Proposed Statute, "[a] judgment of dismissal rendered by a
foreign court, if otherwise entitled to recognition, shall be treated in
the same way as a judgment for the defendant," subject to certain
conditions.241 For example, no preclusive effect will arise in cases
involving dismissals based on the lack of jurisdiction or as a result of
any time limitations, unless the party seeking to rely on the dismissal
shows "that the claim is extinguished under the law applied to the
claim by the rendering court."242 Furthermore, the ALI suggests that
a U.S. court should not give preclusive effect to a foreign judgment
if the dismissal in the foreign court is akin to a dismissal without
prejudice in a U.S. court, such as, for example, a dismissal on the
basis of "defective service, failure to pay the required filing fees,

236.
See 2005
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242

The 2005 Act includes some provisions relating to the burden of proof.
supra note 71, §§ 3(c), 4(d); see also 1962 ACT, supra note 67.
See ALI, supra note 22, § 3(c), at 44.
See id.
See id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 19-20 (1982).
ALI, supra note 22, § 3(d), at 44-45.
Id-

ACT,
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failure to post security, failure to join required parties, or similar
defects."24
The ALI's approach to preclusion in cases involving
judgments based on a dismissal differs somewhat from the approach
adopted in other sorts of matters.244 In most situations, the scope of
preclusion is defined by the law of the country rendering the
judgment rather than by the ALI Proposed Statute.
However, an
alternative approach appears necessary in this context because of the
difficulties associated with determining whether the foreign
dismissal is akin to a U.S. dismissal with prejudice.2 4 6 When
considering that issue, U.S. courts would be well advised to adopt a
functional methodology, since functionalism is designed to
overcome any superficial differences between the common law and
civil law traditions. 247
D.

Section 4 - Preclusionand Challenges to the
Jurisdictionof the Rendering Court

As a general rule, the ALI Proposed Statute gives a foreign
judgment the same preclusive effect that the judgment would receive
in its home jurisdiction. 24 8 The only exception is if the judgment
arises out of certain types of dismissals (as described in Section 3) or
if "the rule of preclusion applicable in the state of origin would be
manifestly incompatible with a superior interest in the United States
in adjudicating or not adjudicating the claim or issue in question." 249
243. Id. Dismissals relating to the lack of timeliness can be particularly
problematic. See id. § 3 reporters' note, at 47.
244. See id. § 3 cmt. d, at 46-47 (discussing the preclusive effect of a
judgment).
245. See id. § 3 cmt. d, at 46; see infra notes 245-258 and accompanying
text (describing Section 4 of the ALI Proposed Statute).
246. See ALI, supra note 22, § 3 cmt. d, at 46 (discussing preclusion issues
regarding foreign dismissals).
247. See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 342, 357 (Mathias Reiman
& Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006).
248. See ALI, supra note 22, § 4(a)-(b), at 47-48 (stating that, with only a
few enumerated exceptions, "a foreign judgment that meets the standards set out in
this Act shall be given the same preclusive effect by a court in the United States
that the judgment would be accorded in the state of origin").
249. Id.
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One way that the United States might have an interest in the scope of
preclusion is if the foreign judgment were based on U.S. law.2 50
U.S. courts could experience some difficulties in ascertaining
the appropriate scope of preclusion, given the amount of variation in
the way different countries approach such matters. 251 However,
defining the scope of preclusion with reference to the law of the
country in which the judgment originated creates a degree of
consistency and predictability that does not currently exist in the
United States.25 2 For example, even those states that rely on
principles of U.S. domestic law to determine the scope of preclusion
(as recommended by the 2005 Act)2 53 have experienced a significant
254
number of problems in practice.
Under the ALI Proposed Statute, the party seeking to rely on
the foreign judgment has the burden of proof for demonstrating the
scope of preclusion under foreign law. 5 This approach makes a
great deal of sense, since the party seeking enforcement should be
particularly well placed to understand the scope of preclusion under
the law of the country rendering the judgment. This technique also
mirrors methods used in the domestic context under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and related statutes.2 5 6 Nevertheless,
commentators have expressed concern about whether and to what
250. See id. § 4 cmt. b, at 49 (recognizing U.S. interest when foreign
judgment implicates U.S. law).
251. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. For example, issue
preclusion (also referred to as collateral estoppel) is not necessarily recognized in
all jurisdictions. See ALI, supra note 22, § 4 reporters' note 1, at 51-52.
252. See ALI, supra note 22, § 4 reporters' note 1, at 51-52; id. note 3, at
53-54.
253. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 7(1) (indicating a foreign judgment is
"conclusive between the parties to the same extent as the judgment of a sister state
entitled to full faith and credit in this state would be conclusive").
254. See ALI, supra note 22, § 4 reporters' note 1, at 51-52; see also id. § 4
reporters' note 3, at 53-54. The 1962 Act does not even discuss matters of
preclusion. See 1962 ACT, supra note 67; see also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS,
supra note 52, § 98.
255. See ALI, supra note 22, § 4(a), at 47-48.
256. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 (requiring full faith and credit among
states); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2013) (same), see also ALI, supra note 22, § 4 cmt. a, at
49 ("The basic rule of preclusion adopted ... in this section is the same as . . .
required in the domestic context by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution and the implementing statute . . . .").
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extent U.S. judges are in a position to determine the scope of
preclusion under foreign law.25
One downside to the ALI's approach to preclusion is the
possibility that courts will rely too heavily on language indicating
that the foreign rule of preclusion is applicable unless it is
"manifestly incompatible with a superior interest in the United
States," 258 thereby allowing the exception to swallow the rule.259
However, that seems to be a risk that will have to be taken, since it is
unlikely that the ALI Proposed Statute would be adopted by
Congress absent this sort of escape clause. 260
Section 4 of the ALI Proposed Statute also introduces a
number of issues relating to challenges to the jurisdiction of the
rendering court at the time of the original proceeding. 26 1 For
example, if the judgment debtor appears in the rendering court at the
time of the original proceeding and challenges the jurisdiction of the
rendering court, then the foreign court's findings of fact and legal
determinations are considered conclusive. 2 62
However, this
determination does not forestall the party resisting recognition or
enforcement in the United States from attempting to show that the
jurisdiction of the original court was unacceptable under Section 6 of
the ALI Proposed Statute. 263
If the judgment debtor appears in the rendering court but does
not enter a jurisdictional challenge, then the party resisting
enforcement or recognition in the United States may not challenge

257. See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, Transnational Class Actions and the
Illusory Search for Res Judicata, 86 TUL. L. REv. 1, 78-79 (2011) (discussing
class actions).
258. ALI, supra note 22, § 4(a), at 47-48; see also supra notes 250-257 and
accompanying text.
259. The ALI describes the numerous difficulties associated with
international preclusion and identifies several possible ways U.S. courts might rely
on the exception to the general rule. See ALI, supra note 22, § 4 cmt. b, at 49-50;
see also id. § 4 reporters' notes 2-3, at 52-54.
260. See id. § 4(a), at 47-48.
261. See id. § 4(b)-(c), at 48.
262. See id. § 4(b), at 48.
263. See id. (allowing parties to renew objections in U.S. courts against the
foreign tribunal's jurisdiction); see also infra notes 372-394 and accompanying
text.
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the jurisdiction of the foreign court under foreign law. 264 However,
that party may nevertheless attempt to demonstrate that the rendering
court's jurisdiction is unacceptable under Section 6 of the ALI
Proposed Statute.2 65
The ALI's approach is somewhat similar to that used in cases
involving sister-state judgments in the domestic context.2 66
However, the ability to challenge recognition or enforcement under
Section 6 of the ALI Proposed Statute introduces a somewhat novel
element. 267
Together, Sections 3 and 4 of the ALI Proposed Statute
provide a much more predictable and comprehensive approach to the
preclusive effect of foreign judgments than currently exists in U.S.
courts.2 6 8 Although some difficulties could arise as a result of
provisions requiring U.S. courts to look to the scope of preclusion
used in the country whence the judgment originated (since U.S.
courts may be less than familiar with foreign law and legal
principles), the ALI's methodology introduces a welcome level of
clarity into the process, since the parties will always know where the
judgment was rendered (and thus what law governs the issue of
preclusion), even if they do not know where the judgment will be
recognized and enforced. Furthermore, the ALI has addressed a
number of issues (such as dismissals and defaults) that are not
adequately covered under existing U.S. law.
E.

Section 5 - Standardsfor Non-Recognition and NonEnforcement

Section 5 sets forth the basic terms on which a foreign
judgment can be refused recognition and enforcement under the ALI
Proposed Statute and, in conjunction with Section 7, reflects the only

264. See ALI, supra note 22, § 4(b), at 48 (requiring parties to challenge the
foreign court's jurisdiction before challenging it in the United States).
265. See id. § 4(b), at 48; see also infra notes 372-394 and accompanying
text.
266. See ALI, supra note 22, § 4 reporters' note 4, at 54-55.
267. See id. (discussing jurisdictional challenges under U.S. standards set
out in Section 6); see also infra notes 372-394 and accompanying text.
268. See ALI, supra note 22, §§ 3-4, at 43-55.
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grounds upon which recognition or enforcement may be refused.2 69
This approach provides a great deal of finality and makes it
impossible, for example, to argue that the foreign judgment was
"inadequate or excessive, or that the claim on which the foreign
judgment was based or the relief granted is not known in the United
States or in the state where recognition or enforcement is sought."27 0
The section is broken into four basic parts: mandatory nonrecognition and -enforcement (subsection a), recognition and
enforcement in the face of a forum selection clause (subsection b),
discretionary non-recognition and -enforcement (subsection c), and
burdens of proof (subsection d).27 1 Given the importance of this
particular provision, it is useful to consider each element in detail.
1.

Mandatory Grounds

The ALI Proposed Statute identifies six different
circumstances that will result in the mandatory non-recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment in the United States.27 2 They
include judgments that were rendered:
* by a "system (whether national or local) that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with fundamental principles of fairness;"
* "in circumstances that raise substantial and justifiable
doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with
respect to the judgment in question;"
* "on a basis of jurisdiction" that is "unacceptable"
under Section 6 of the ALI Proposed Statute;
* "without notice reasonably calculated to inform the
defendant of the pendency of the proceeding in a timely
manner;" or

269. See id. § 5, at 55-58; see also id. § 5 cmt. b, at 58.
270. Id. § 5 cmt. b, at 58. The one exception is if the judgment is repugnant
to the public policy of the United States or an individual state. See supra notes
260-266 and accompanying text.
271. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5, at 55-58.
272. See id. § 5(a), at 55-56.
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* through "fraud that had the effect of depriving the party
resisting recognition or enforcement of adequate
opportunity to present its case to the court." 273
Judgments will also be deemed non-recognizable and -enforceable if
they are "repugnant to the public policy of the United States, or to
the public policy of a particular state of the United States when the
relevant legal interest, right, or policy is regulated by state law." 274
Although the basic principles of non-recognition
and -enforcement under the ALI Proposed Statute are reminiscent of
those outlined under the 1962 Act, 2005 Act, and Restatement, some
differences do arise. 2 75
Each ground of non-recognition
and -enforcement is considered in turn.

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4; 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 4; ALI,
supra note 22, § 5(a), at 55-56; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 77, § 481 (1987).

108

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

a.

[Vol. 33:1I

Fairness

The first area of discussion involves the criteria surrounding
the fairness of the foreign proceeding.276 One of the more significant
innovations of the 2005 Act was the principle that a court could
refuse enforcement and recognition of a foreign judgment because
"the specific proceeding in the foreign court . . . was not compatible

with the requirements of due process of law." 277 The ALI declined
to focus on individualized concerns in this way and instead
concentrates on systemic problems so as to promote a more
pro-enforcement regime.278 Although some commentators have
criticized the ALI for adopting this approach on the grounds that it
does not allow (or require) courts to take U.S. principles of due
process properly into account, other observers have expressed fewer
concerns based on the belief that it is improper to impose U.S.
constitutional values on foreign countries through the recognition
and enforcement process.2 7 9
The standards for unfairness under the ALI Proposed Statute
appear to be the same as those enunciated in Hilton v. Guyot.280
Therefore, there needs to be an "opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction," with "regular
proceedings," sufficient notice, an "impartial administration of
justice" as between nationals and non-nationals, and the absence of
"either prejudice . .. or fraud." 28 1 The foreign court does not need to
adopt procedures similar to those in use in the United States so long
as the foreign proceedings comply with what Judge Richard Posner
276. Due process is a significant concern in this area of law. See Brand,
supra note 6, at 82 (suggesting that U.S. jurisdictional rules are based on
protecting the due process rights of the defendant, not on access to justice);
Carodine, supra note 26, at 1162-64 (discussing the notion of international due
process); Luthin, supra note 11, at 125-36 (discussing due process issues arising in
the recognition of foreign judgments).
277. 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(8).
278. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. c, at 58-59, reporters' note 2, at 6870.
279. See Carodine,supra note 26, at 1246; Luthin, supra note 11, at 132-34;
Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 186-209 (2004);
Whytock & Robertson, supra note 12, at 1516.
280. See 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895); ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. c, at 58-59;
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
281. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03.
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has called the "international concept of due process."282 Thus, under
the ALI approach, "[a] judicial system may fail to meet the criteria
of fairness in general, or in its treatment of particular classes of
litigants, such as Jews in Germany under Hitler or blacks in South
Africa under apartheid." 2 83
The challenge to the fairness of the foreign legal system may
focus on either national or local concerns and can be based on
"general knowledge or judicial notice, and without formal proof."284
As with other defenses described in this section, the ALI places the
burden of proof on the judgment debtor. 285
b.

Corruptionand Lack ofIntegrity

Although the ALI focuses on systemic concerns in the area of
due process, issues relating to judicial corruption and lack of
integrity consider the actions of the rendering court, rather than the
foreign judicial system as a whole.2 86 To assert a successful defense
under this provision, the party resisting recognition or enforcement
must not only show corruption in the underlying proceeding but must
also demonstrate the probable effect of the lack of integrity on the
outcome of the dispute. 287 Furthermore, "[iun ruling that the burden
has been satisfied, the court in the United States must explain the
reasons for its doubt about the integrity of the judgment in
question. 2 8 8
282. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000); see
also ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. c, at 60, reporters' note 2, at 68-69.
283. ALI, supra note 22, § 5 reporters' note 2, at 70.
284. Id. § 5 cmt. c, at 58. However, many of the methods of proof currently
used will likely be deemed sufficient under the ALI regime. See supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
285. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 reporters' note 2, at 70.
286. See id. § 5 cmt. d, at 60 ("[T]he burden is on the person resisting
recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment to show circumstances that
raise substantial and justifiable doubt about the integrity of the rendering court.").
There is some inconsistency between the comments and the reporters' notes, with
the latter suggesting that the impropriety in question could relate to systemic
corruption or corruption in the proceedings giving rise to the judgment pending in
U.S. court. Compare id. with id. § 5 reporters' note 3, at 70.
287. See id. § 5 cmt. d, at 60.
288. Id.

110

THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION

[Vol. 33: 1

The ALI Proposed Statute is not the first enactment to deny
recognition and enforcement to a judgment rendered in the face of
289
The 2005 Act has a similar provision,
potential corruption.
although the 2005 Act speaks of "substantial doubt about the
integrity of the rendering court" rather than "substantial and
justifiable doubt." 290 In focusing on these issues, the ALI Proposed
Statute and the 2005 Act are addressing growing concerns about the
high rate of judicial corruption in many countries. 29 ' Notably, the
ALI's emphasis on individualized harm under this subsection may
alleviate any uneasiness relating to the absence of an individualized
focus under the due process provision. 292
c.

Lack ofJurisdiction

The ALI prohibits recognition and enforcement of a
judgment if the basis on which the rendering court took jurisdiction
over the initial matter is deemed unacceptable under Section 6(a) of
the ALI Proposed Statute. 293 This provision is discussed in more
detail below.
As a general rule, "any basis of jurisdiction that would meet
the requirements of due process if asserted in an action in the United
States will meet the requirements of jurisdiction for recognition or
enforcement of a foreign judgment."295 Furthermore, a party may
usually only challenge the jurisdiction of the rendering court
pursuant to the principles set forth in Section 6 of the ALI Proposed

289. See id. § 5(a)(ii), at 55.
290. 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(7) (allowing non-recognition
or -enforcement in cases where "the judgment was rendered in circumstances that
raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the
judgment"); ALI, supra note 22, § 5(a)(ii), at 55; see also id. § 5 cmt. d, at 60. The
ALI's approach appears somewhat more rigorous than that of the 2005 Act, which
is in keeping with the ALI's pro-enforcement bias. See id.; see also 2005 ACT,
supra note 71.
291. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 reporters' note c, at 70; see also supra
notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
293. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. e, at 60-61; see also infra notes
379-402 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 372-394 and accompanying text.
295. ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. e, at 61.
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Statute.
The one exception is if the judgment in question was
obtained by default.2 97 In that case, "the judgment debtor may
challenge the judicial jurisdiction of the rendering court both under
the law of the state of origin and under the standards of §6."298
d.

Notice

The ALI Proposed Statute's provision on notice is largely
unremarkable, given that it echoes the language reflected in both the
2005 Act and the 1962 Act. 299 However, the ALI makes insufficient
notice a mandatory ground for non-recognition and -enforcement, 3 00
whereas the 2005 Act and the 1962 Act indicate that problematic
notice merely constitutes a discretionary grounds for non-recognition
or -enforcement. 31 The ALI's approach not only has the benefit of
increased clarity and predictability, it also helps offset any charges
that the ALI is being too permissive in its attitude towards the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
e.

Fraud

The ALI Proposed Statute requires U.S. courts to deny
recognition and enforcement to judgments involving "extrinsic
fraud." 3 02 This approach makes sense, given that those situations
involve foreign courts that merely have "colorable jurisdiction" over

296. See id. § 5 reporters' note 4, at 71-72 (discussing the defense of lack of
judicial jurisdiction of the rendering court).
297. See id.
298. Id. § 5 cmt. 4, at 72.
299. Compare id. § 5(a)(iv), at 55-56 (requiring non-recongition when "the
judgment was rendered without notice reasonably calculated to inform the
defendant of the pendency of the procceding in a timely manner"), with 2005 ACT,
supra note 71, § 4(c)(1) (discussing situations in which "the defendant in the
proceeding in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceeding in
sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend"), and 1962 ACT, supra note 67,
§ 4(b)(1) (same).
300. ALI, supra note 22, § 5(a)(iv), at 56.
301. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(1); 1962 ACT, supra note 67,
§ 4(b)(1)
302. ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. g, at 62.
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the parties or the dispute. 3 0 3 Claims of "'intrinsic' fraud . . . will not
normally defeat recognition or enforcement in a court in the United
States, since such an assertion should have been raised in the

rendering court." 304
Comparative analysis suggests that the ALI's approach is
superior to existing laws in a number of different ways. 30 5 For
example, although a foreign judgment rendered in the face of "fraud
that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to present
its case" may be denied recognition or enforcement under the 2005
Act, that provision speaks only of judicial discretion rather than a
mandatory duty. 306 The 1962 Act similarly allows non-recognition
and -enforcement of a foreign judgment arising out of fraud, but only
on a discretionary basis. 307 The 1962 Act is also somewhat
ambiguous in that it only refers to fraud as a general concern without
any further distinguishing factors.30 8 Thus, the ALI Proposed Statute
not only takes a more rigorous stance towards judgments arising out
of the most problematic types of wrongdoing (in that the ALI
requires non-recognition and -enforcement in cases involving
extrinsic fraud), it also provides a more clear and predictable
approach to these sorts of analyses by eliminating the element of

discretion. 309

303. Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999); see also
Falcon v. Faulkner, 567 N.E.2d 686, 694-95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("The classic
definition of 'extrinsic fraud' refers to situations where 'the unsuccessful party has
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case . . . as by keeping him away from
court . . . or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit."') (quoting

United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878)).
304. ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. g, at 62 (citing false testimony in a foreign
proceeding and introduction of a forged document as examples of "intrinsic
fraud"); see also John Sanderson & Co. (Wool) Pty. v. Ludlow Jute Co., 569 F.2d
696, 697-98 (1st Cir. 1978) ("When an action is brought in a court of this country,
by a citizen of a foreign country against one of our own citizens . .

.

and the

foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court . . . it should
be held conclusive on the merits . . . .").

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See ALI, supra note 22, § 5(a)(v), at 56.
2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(2).
See 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 4(b)(2).
See id.
See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. 6, at 73.
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PublicPolicy

Existing laws relating to the recognition or enforcement of a
foreign judgment all include a public policy provision, and the ALI
Proposed Statute is no exception.3 10 However, the language adopted
by the ALI is somewhat different from that seen elsewhere, in that
the ALI Proposed Statute indicates that the violation of public policy
constitutes a mandatory, rather than discretionary, ground for nonrecognition and -enforcement. 311
The scope of the ALI Proposed Statute's public policy
provision is similar to that of the 2005 Act and the Restatement, in
that the ALI makes reference to the public policy relating to both the
judgment and the claim on which the judgment is based.3 12 The
1962 Act, on the other hand, only refers to public policies relating to
the cause of action and is therefore narrower than the ALI Proposed
Statute.313
The standard for making out a defense based on public policy
is quite high under existing case law, 3 14 and the ALI Proposed

310.

§ 4(b)(3);

See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(3); 1962 ACT, supra
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(2)(d)

note 67,
(1987);

ALI, supra note 22, § 5(a)(vi), at 56.
311. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(3); 1962 ACT, supra note 67,
§ 4(b)(3); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 77, § 482(2)(d); ALI,
supra note 22, § 5(a)(vi), at 56.
312. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(c)(3); 1962 ACT, supra note 67,
§ 4(b)(3); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(2)(d) (1987);
ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. h, at 63; Stewart, supra note 11, at 188. For example,
under the ALI approach, an award as to interest (i.e., an issue specific to the
judgment in question) could provide the basis for a defense based on public policy
as much as a quality of the underlying claim. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. h,
at 63.
313. See 1962 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(b)(3); ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. h,
at 63.
314. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci6t6 G6n6rale de
L'Industrie du Paper (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing the
invocation of public policy defenses and narrow construction of those defenses);
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918) (discussing public
policy defense)
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Statute is likely to use a similar standard.3 1 5 The "guiding
definition" indicates that the public policy defense is only applicable
if recognizing or enforcing a foreign judgment "would violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."3 16 This
approach significantly narrows the range of allegations that could
support a defense based on public policy. For example, a party
would be unable to assert a public policy defense based solely on the
notion that the underlying claim is not one that could have been
asserted in the place where recognition or enforcement is now being
sought.3 17
The ALI reporters take the view that parties cannot assert a
general public policy defense for any behavior that is covered
elsewhere in the ALI Proposed Statute.3 18 In this, the ALI differs
somewhat from existing law, since parties have sometimes been able
to assert both generalized and specialized claims relating to the same
issue.319 Going forward, parties will also be unable to rely on the
public policy exception to assert certain First Amendment-based
defenses to the recognition and enforcement of judgments involving
allegedly defamatory material published on the internet, since these
sorts of concerns are now covered by subject-specific legislation. 320
Courts considering a public policy defense may face some
conflict-of-laws concerns if the party asserting the defense is relying
on individual state (as opposed to national) policies or regulations,
since the U.S. state with the most compelling interest in the events
and parties may not be the place where the action to recognize or
315. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 reporters' note 7(a), at 75 (suggesting that
public policy is offended if the subject matter of the judgment arouses local
opposition to enforcement); Stewart, supra note 11, at 188.
316. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202. Interestingly, the public policy defense could
be based on a principle of international law. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. h, at
63.
317. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 reporters' note 7(a), at 74.
318. See id. § 5 cmt. h, at 63.
319. See id. However, the ALI Proposed Statute "preserves a residual
authority in the court to decline to enforce a judgment that appears to be the result
of some overall unfairness in the rendering of the judgment, even if none of the
other specific defenses set out in this section are clearly applicable." Id. § 5 cmt.
h, at 63; see also id. § 5 reporters' note 7(b), at 77.
320. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; ALI, supra note 22, § 5 reporters' note 7(d),
at 79-82; see also supra notes 66, 85-87 and accompanying text.
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enforce the judgment is brought.32 1 However, the ALI has proposed
a relatively straightforward solution. If the defense is based on a
state regulation, then the court should apply that regulation
regardless of where the action is brought.322 Alternatively, if the
defense is based on a policy interest, then the court should apply the
policy of the state where the action is brought. 323 In the latter
category of cases, a court may not apply state policy without
considering other factors, since "[a] particular state's public
policy ... is to be measured against the national interest in favor of
recognition and enforcement." 32 4
2.

Discretionary Grounds

The preceding discussion addressed mandatory grounds for
non-recognition and -enforcement of a foreign judgment under the
325
However, there may be times when a
ALI Proposed Statute.
court may be able to deny recognition or enforcement of a foreign
judgment on a discretionary basis. According to the ALI Proposed
Statute, a U.S. court may refuse recognition or enforcement of a
foreign judgment as a matter of discretion if:
*

the state whence the judgment originated "did not have
jurisdiction to prescribe" the behavior in question or the
rendering court did not have subject-matter competence
over the controversy;
* "the judgment is irreconcilable with another foreign
judgment entitled to recognition or enforcement under
[the ALI Proposed Statute] and involving the same
parties;"
* the proceedings that resulted in the judgment in question
were initiated after an action involving the same parties
and the same subject matter was initiated in the United
321. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. h, at 64.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See id. § 5(a), at 55-56; see also supra notes 261-317 and
accompanying text.
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States, and the U.S. action was neither stayed nor
dismissed; or
* the proceedings that resulted in the judgment in question
were "undertaken with a view to frustrating a claimant's
opportunity to have the claim adjudicated in a more
appropriate court in the United States, whether by an
anti-suit injunction or restraining order, by a declaration
of nonliability, or by other means." 326
Although some of these provisions are similar to those
existing under current law, there are a number of differences that
need to be discussed.
a.

Jurisdictionto Prescribe

The first type of situation that can lead to a discretionary
denial of recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment involves
circumstances in which the rendering court did not have "jurisdiction
to prescribe" the activity in question. 327
"'Legislative' or
'prescriptive' jurisdiction involves the authority of a state to make its
substantive laws applicable to conduct, relationships or status," 32 8
and the ALI in this instance is allowing U.S. courts to deny
recognition or enforcement when the "foreign judgment results from
the application of regulatory law of the state of origin to matters
more appropriately regulated by the law of the United States or of a
third country." 32 9 This provision is somewhat unique since the ALI
Proposed Statute does not generally allow a U.S. court to deny
326. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5(c), at 57.
327. Id.
328. BoRN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 11, at 591. "Judicial jurisdiction" (also
known as "jurisdiction to adjudicate" or "adjudicative jurisdiction") refers to the
ability of a court to assert its power over certain parties or claims. Id. at 1.
329. ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. i, at 64. Questions about the proper limits
of prescriptive jurisdiction are on the rise as cross-border disputes become
increasingly complex and increasingly common. In the absence of a single
political actor with comprehensive authority over international wrongdoing,
national courts often feel compelled to address certain cross-border injuries
pursuant to their own national laws. See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16;
Nagareda, supra note 178, at 13; Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 178, at
913. The failure to adjudicate these issues can lead to regulatory mismatches. See
supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment because the
foreign court made the wrong decision in a conflict-of-law
analysis. 330 However, an exception is made in the context of
regulatory concerns, since those issues are of heightened importance
to the United States.33 '
A U.S. court may also deny recognition or enforcement of a
foreign judgment if the rendering court did not have proper subject
matter jurisdiction over the dispute. 332 Thus, for example, a U.S.
court could deny recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment
involving real estate located in the United States. 33 3 However,
claims that an action was heard in the wrong court in the foreign
jurisdiction-for example, a civil court rather than a commercial
non-recognition
in
result
usually
not
court-would
33 4
or -enforcement.
b.

IrreconcilableJudgments or
Proceedings

One of the key problems facing international litigants is the
possibility of irreconcilable judgments or proceedings arising out of
parallel litigation. 335 The ALI attempts to avoid inconsistencies
between two foreign judgments (what might be called Judgment A
and Judgment B) involving the same parties by focusing on whether
the court that rendered Judgment A (the judgment that is now being
considered by a U.S. court) had an opportunity to determine whether
Judgment B would be inconsistent with Judgment A336 Under the
ALI Proposed Statute, a U.S. court should typically recognize and
enforce Judgment A if the rendering court considered the possibility
of inconsistency with Judgment B under standards similar to those
described in the ALI Proposed Statute.33 7 If, however, the rendering
court did not give fair consideration to Judgment B, then the U.S.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. i, at 64.
See id.
See id. § 5, cmt. i, at 65.
See id.
See id.
See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, para. 15.
See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. j, at 65.
See id. § 5 cmt. j, at 65.
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court could legitimately deny recognition and enforcement to
Judgment A. 33 8 Similar analyses can and should be conducted in
cases involving ongoing proceedings, since the ALI Proposed Statute
does not require the disputes to have reached final judgment. 33 9
Notably, this provision only addresses judgments from, or
If a foreign judgment is
proceedings in, non-U.S. courts.3 4 0
irreconcilable with a judgment rendered by a U.S. court, then the
U.S. judgment must be given precedence pursuant to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and associated legislation, regardless of when the
various actions were commenced or concluded.
c.

InappropriateForum

ALI recommendations relating to irreconcilable judgments or
proceedings involving two foreign judgments differ from those
involving foreign judgments rendered in the face of a U.S.
proceeding. The ALI Proposed Statute addresses the issue of
parallel litigation involving U.S. and foreign courts by allowing a
U.S. court to deny recognition or enforcement of any judgment
arising out of a foreign proceeding if the foreign proceeding was
initiated after a U.S. proceeding involving the same parties and the
same subject matter had begun. 42 The ALI adopted this approach
"to create an incentive for a forei n court to decline jurisdiction in
favor of a prior U.S. proceeding." 3
d.

Anti-Suit Injunctions

Anti-suit injunctions are typically sought "(i) to prevent a
pending or threatened action in a foreign forum; (ii) to prevent
relitigation elsewhere after issuance of a judgment; and (iii) to
338. See id. (noting that the United States may, in appropriate
circumstances, decline to recognize the judgment presented).
339. See id. § 5 cmt. j, at 65-66.
340. See id. § 5 cmt. j, at 66.
341. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2013); ALI, supra note
22, § 5 cmt. j, at 66.
342. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. k, at 66-67. The ALI notes that the
U.S. proceeding must not have been stayed or dismissed. See id. § 5(c)(iii), at 57.
343. Id. § 5 cmt. k, at 66-67 (noting that U.S. courts have no power to halt
duplicative foreign litigation).
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protect against an anti-suit injunction in a foreign forum." 344
Although these devices were initially available only in a few
common law jurisdictions, a growing number of legal systems,
including those from the civil law tradition, now allow such
procedures. 345 As such, U.S. courts may be facing an increasing
number of requests to recognize or enforce a foreign anti-suit
injunction or similar type of device.
The ALI Proposed Statute takes the view that these sorts of
orders may be recognized and enforced in the United States, but only
as a matter of discretion. 34 6 In so doing, the ALI recognizes that
anti-suit injunctions and similar measures may be issued by a foreign
court with the intent of frustrating a U.S. action.34 7 Although some
unpredictability will exist as a result of the use of judicial discretion,
the ALI Proposed Statute nevertheless constitutes an improvement
over existing law, since no other enforcement regime addresses
questions relating to foreign orders or injunctions. 34 8
The ALI's anti-suit provision is also remarkable because it
reverses the general rule, enunciated in Section 11(a), that the court
first seised of a matter is presumed to be the proper adjudicator of
the dispute. 349 In so doing, the ALI discourages parties from using
344. Id. § 5 reporters' note 9, at 83 (describing situations in which
injunctions are sought, why they are disfavored, and why they do not often resolve
conflict of parallel litigation and sometimes lead to further conflict). Efforts to
block anti-suit injunctions (typically referred to as anti-anti-suit injunctions) are a
relatively recent development. See S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders Between
InternationalCommercialArbitration and U.S. FederalCourts: A Jurisprudential
GPS, 2012 J. DisP. RESOL. 119, 164.
345. See, e.g., Andrey Y. Astapov, Ukraine, 45 INT'L LAW. 581, 593 (2011)
(discussing Ukrainian anti-suit injunctions); Tanya J. Monestier, (Still) a "Real
and Substantial" Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada, 39 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 396, 445 n.147 (2013) (discussing Canadian anti-suit injunctions); Mark
Stiggelbout, The Recognition in England and Wales of United States Judgments in
Class Actions, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 433, 471 (2011) (discussing English anti-suit
injunctions); Daniel Tan, Enforcing International Arbitration Agreements in
FederalCourts: Rethinking the Courts' Remedial Power, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 545,
596 (2007) (noting the spread of anti-suit injunctions to civil law jurisdictions).
346. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. 1,at 67.
347. See id.
348. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
349. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. 1, at 67; see also infra notes 447-459
and accompanying text.
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injunctive and declaratory actions as a means of racing to the
courthouse.
3.

Forum Selection Agreements

The ALI Proposed Statute includes a specific provision
regarding forum selection agreements, which includes choice of
court agreements of the type contemplated by COCA as well as
arbitration agreements. 350 According to the ALI, U.S. courts are
prohibited from recognizing or enforcing a judgment rendered by a
foreign court if the proceeding was contrary to one of these exclusive
forum selection agreements.351 The ALI Proposed Statute is silent as
to the form that the forum selection agreement must take, thereby
leaving that issue to be determined pursuant to national or
international law.35 2
There are some exceptions to this general rule. For example,
if the party resisting recognition or enforcement in the United States
participated in the foreign proceeding without raising the existence
of the forum selection agreement as a defense, then the U.S. court
should recognize or enforce the judgment unless it was "clear" that a
defense based on the existence of a forum selection clause "would
have been futile." 353
However, if the party resisting recognition and enforcement
did assert the protection of the forum selection clause and the court
rendering the foreign judgment "held that the agreement was
inapplicable or invalid, [then] the judgment shall not be denied
recognition or enforcement" unless that determination "was
This outcome is consistent with
manifestly unreasonable." 354
350. See COCA, supra note 4; ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. b, cmt. f, at 56,
61.
351. ALI, supra note 22, § 5(b), at 56.
352. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202 (2013); COCA, supra note 4, art. 3; New
York Convention, supra note 21, art. 11(2). Forum selection agreements may be in
writing or in some other form that the parties have established independently or
See ALI, supra note 22, § 5(f), at 61
through custom, trade, and usage.
(articulating the policy of honoring forum-selection agreements). Such agreements
See id.
may be embedded within a larger contract or entirely independent.
(explaining that forum-selection agreements are generally regarded as effective if
contained in a contract or in a special agreement to settle a particular dispute).
353. ALI, supra note 22, § 5(b)(ii), at 56.
354. Id. § 5(b)(iii), at 56-57.
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COCA, although the ALI's approach is somewhat more
comprehensive, since COCA "does not address judgments rendered
in contravention of forum-selection agreements, leaving that issue to
national law." 355 Neither the 1962 Act nor the 2005 Act addresses
situations involving forum selection agreements. 356
4.

Burden of Proof

The ALI Proposed Statute also addresses issues relating to
burdens of proof.3 57 Under the ALI approach, the party resisting
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment has the burden of
proof in cases where there is no forum selection clause. 35 8 This
method is also adopted by the 2005 Act. 359 However, some U.S.
courts follow the opposite rule and place the burden of proving the
absence of a mandatory ground for non-recognition on the judgment
creditor.3 60
If, however, the party opposing recognition and enforcement
raises the existence of a forum-selection agreement as a defense,
then the burden shifts to the party seeking enforcement or
recognition of the judgment to show the inapplicability of the forum
selection agreement. 361 Notably, "[i]f the judgment debtor failed to
appear in the rendering court," the ALI's approach means that "the

355. Id. § 5 reporters' note 5, at 73; see also COCA, supra note 4; ALI,
supra note 22, § 5 cmt. f, at 62 (discussing the applicability and validity of forumselection agreements and describing the criteria for assessing unreasonableness).
356. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71; 1962 ACT, supra note 67.
357. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5(d), at 57-58.
358. See id.
359. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 4(d). The 1962 Act is silent on this
issue. See 1962 ACT, supra note 67.
360. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5 reporters' note 1, at 67-68 (stating that
"[s]ome courts have stated that the burden is on the judgment creditor to prove that
no mandatory basis for non-recognition exists"); see also S.C. Chimexim S.A. v.
Velco Enters. Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
361. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5(d), at 57-58. COCA does not address
burdens of proof, but the ALI approach appears consistent with the terms of the
convention. See COCA, supra note 4, arts. 13-14 (discussing enforcement
procedures).
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issue of validity of the forum-selection agreement will be contested
only in the court of the United States." 362
5.

Intermediate Comparison

A brief comparison of Section 5 of the ALI Proposed Statute
to existing law suggests that the ALI has made a number of
improvements to the standards and procedures relating to recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments.363
Although clarity and
uniformity are the two most obvious advantages, the ALI promotes
not only clear law, but also good law.36 4
One of the key ways that the ALI advances the law in this
field is by promoting a pro-enforcement regime while
simultaneously providing sufficient safeguards for U.S. parties and
interests. For example, the ALI Proposed Statute may appear to be
too permissive in the way that it limits fairness-based defenses of
recognition and enforcement to systemic rather than individual
concerns, but any concerns in that regard are offset by the fact that
due process violations constitute a mandatory rather than
discretionary ground for non-recognition and enforcement. 365 The
ALI also ensures that judgment debtors can raise individualized
issues relating to the rendering court under the provision relating to
lack of integrity.366 However, the ALI again provides an appropriate
balance between the interests of the judgment debtor and the
judgment creditor by drawing the corruption defense quite narrowly
and requiring the U.S. court to identify a link between the improper
behavior and the judgment itself.367
One of the challenges facing the ALI involves whether and to
what extent U.S. policies and principles should affect recognition
362. ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. f, at 61-62.
363. See id. § 5, at 55-58.
364. See Kristen David Adams, The American Law Institute: Justice
Cardozo's Ministry of Justice?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 173, 183 (2007) (describing
efforts by the ALI and prominent jurists to ensure that the legislative process
produces "good law, not just clear law").
365. See ALI, supra note 22, § 5(a)(i), at 55.
366. See id. § 5(a)(ii), at 55 (providing for discretionary non-recognition
when a judgment "was rendered in circumstances that raise a substantial and
justifiable doubt about about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the
judgment in question").
367. See id.
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and enforcement of foreign judgments. The ALI Proposed Statute
appears to do well in this regard, since provisions relating to
insufficient notice and extrinsic fraud successfully reinforce
universal notions of procedural fairness without falling prey to the
charge that U.S. courts are exporting U.S. constitutional values. 3 68
The public policy defense, though somewhat nebulous (as indeed all
such provisions are), also imposes certain useful limits, such as the
ban on using the general provision to make objections that could be
asserted elsewhere under the statute. 369
Although the ALI takes a somewhat more U.S.-centric
approach to the discretionary grounds for non-recognition and enforcement, the standards nevertheless promote predictability and
neutrality.37 0 While it is unclear whether the ALI's approach will
actually "create an incentive for a foreign court to decline
jurisdiction in favor of a prior U.S. proceeding," there is at least
some logic to the methodology that has been adopted.3 7 1
F.

Section 6 - UnacceptableBases ofJurisdiction

When considering whether to recognize or enforce a foreign
judgment, the U.S. court must be assured that the rendering court had
proper jurisdiction over the parties and the dispute.3 72 The 2005 Act
and the 1962 Act handled this issue by listing the grounds of
jurisdiction that were considered acceptable for the foreign court to
assert and allowing U.S. courts to refuse recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in all other circumstances.37 3 The
ALI Proposed Statute reverses this approach and instead lists the
368. See id. § 5(a)(iv)-(v), at 56.
369. See id. § 5(a)(v), at 56.
370. Thus, for example, provisions relating to multiple actions balance
comity with efficiency. See supra notes 335-343 and accompanying text.
371. ALI, supra note 22, § 5 cmt. k, at 67. The United States has attempted
to lead by example in other areas of law, with questionable success. See S.I.
Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782: Distinguishing International
Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LITIG. 295 (2013) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2013))
372. To enforce a judgment when the rendering court did not have proper
jurisdiction would constitute a breach of due process. See ALI, supra note 22, § 6,
at 84-85; Luthin, supra note 11, at 132-36.
373. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 5; 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 5.
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types of foreign jurisdiction that are considered unacceptable,
thereby allowing U.S. courts to recognize or enforce judgments in all
other circumstances.37 4 In so doing, the ALI Proposed Statute "goes
further" than existing law by "recognizing and enforcing some
judgments where the jurisdictional basis of the rendering court does
not mirror bases asserted by courts in the United States." 7 5
Section 6 of the ALI Proposed Statute is framed in mandatory
terms and indicates that a U.S. court must deny recognition and
enforcement of a judgment if the rendering court's jurisdiction was
based on:
*

*
*
*

*

the presence or seizure of the defendant's property in the
forum state, unless the underlying claim asserts an
interest in or is related to the property, or arises in the
context of an action in admiralty or maritime law;
the plaintiff s nationality;
the plaintiffs domicile, residence, or place of
incorporation;
jurisdiction arising out of service of process while the
defendant was transiting the foreign state, "unless no
other appropriate forum was reasonably available;" or
"any other basis that is unreasonable or unfair given the
nature of the claim and the identity of the parties,"
although jurisdiction is not to be deemed unreasonable
or unfair simply because U.S. courts do not provide for a
similar basis ofjurisdiction. 376

Many of these principles have been well-discussed as a
matter of both domestic and private international law, so the ALI is
not breaking new ground, conceptually speaking. 377 For example,
prohibiting jurisdiction based on property in the forum state in cases
where the claim is unrelated to the property itself echoes principles

374. See ALI, supra note 22, § 6, cmt. a, at 84-85.
375. See id. § 6 reporters' note 5, at 91.
376. Id. § 6(a), at 84.
377. See id. § 6 cmt. b, at 85 (noting features of subsection (a) that are in
line with contemporary approaches and developments in international and
domestic law).
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enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner.3 78

Jurisdiction on the basis of nationality has long been disapproved of
by most countries, although it is.permitted in France. 379 Jurisdiction
based on the domicile, residence, or place of incorporation of the
plaintiff is widely condemned, unlike jurisdiction based on the
domicile, residence, or place of incorporation of the defendant.3 80
So-called "tag" or "transient" jurisdiction also meets with nearly
universal disapprobation; indeed, the United States may be the sole
proponent of this particular practice.38 1
Section 6 includes a catch-all provision that requires a court
to deny recognition or enforcement if the exercise of jurisdiction by
the rendering court was unreasonable or unfair. 3 82 The ALI suggests
that although "[a] court should not regard an exercise of jurisdiction
as unfair solely because it was founded on a basis that has not been
accepted in the United States, . . . U.S. practice may be relevant in

making the required assessment." 383 Although some courts and
commentators may find this kind of reliance on U.S. legal principles
384
this approach is potentially problematic both for
appropriate,
378. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196, 207-12 (1977) (discussing
quasi in rem jurisdiction).
379. See ALI, supra note 22, § 6 cmt. b, at 86.
380. See id.
381. See id. § 6 reporters' note 1, at 88 (recognizing that while "tag"
jurisdiction was found constitutional by the United States Supreme Court, the
international legal community questions such jurisdiction); BORN & RUTLEDGE,
supra note 11, at 129-37. However, some commentators have taken the view that
"tag" or transient jurisdiction is necessary in cases involving international human
rights violations. See ALI, supra note 22, § 6 reporters' note 2, at 89 (recognizing
support for transient jurisdiction); Van Schaack, supra note 34, at 194. The
Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure consider tag jurisdiction acceptable in
exceptional circumstances, although most commentators view that feature as a
concession to U.S. interests. See ALI, supra note 22, § 6 cmt. b, at 86-87; see also
ALI/UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 1820 (2006)
(discussing Principle 2 and Comment P-2B); Dubinsky, supra note 28, at 328-34;
Simona Grossi, Rethinking the Harmonization of JurisdictionalRules, 86 TUL. L.
REV. 623, 678-83 (2012).
382. See ALI, supra note 22, § 6 cmt. c, at 87.
383. Id. (emphasis omitted).
384. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 785 (arguing that U.S. courts should
accept foreign judgments based on foreign laws that would be considered
unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution).
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pragmatic reasons (in that it could open the door to numerous
challenges) as well as principled concerns (in that it could allow
courts to ignore jurisdictional bases that are considered perfectly
acceptable in the international context, even if they are not known in
the United States).3 85 However, the ALI Proposed Statute mitigates
any untoward effects by "creat[ing] a presumption that judgments
that rest on a proper exercise of jurisdiction under the law of the state
of origin and do not fall within the grounds of jurisdiction identified
in subsections (a)(i)-(a)(iv) are entitled to recognition, subject to the
defenses listed in §§5-7."3
Even if a judgment is technically based on an unacceptable
form of jurisdiction, a U.S. court may nevertheless recognize or
enforce that judgment if the facts clearly demonstrate the existence
of jurisdictional grounds that are not considered unacceptable
under Section 6.387 Although this provision increases the number of
judgments that are eligible for recognition and enforcement in the
United States, the ALI Proposed Statute does not indicate how
alternative jurisdictional facts are to be entered into evidence and
what standard or burden of proof is to be used to decide such
matters, which is somewhat problematic.3 8 8
Parties may resist enforcement or recognition of a judgment
in the United States under Section 6 even if they failed to object to
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment at the time of the
initial procedure. 389 This approach avoids the need for a defendant
to raise a futile defense in the rendering court so as to preserve the
defendant's right to object to the jurisdiction of the rendering court
in a U.S. enforcement action. 3 90 Defenses under Section 6 are also
385. For example, certain types of jurisdiction that are available in the
European Union are not known in the United States. See Owusu v. Jackson,
[20051 Q.B. 801 (Eng.) (discussing jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention);
ALI, supra note 22, § 6 reporters' note 3, at 89-90; S.I. Strong, Backyard
Advantage: New Rules Mean That U.S. Companies May be Forced to Litigate
Across the Pond,28 LEGAL TIMES 43, May 23, 2005.
386. ALI, supra note 22, § 6 cmt. c, at 87.
387. See id. § 6(b), cmt. 4, at 85, 90-91.
388. See id. § 6(b), at 84.
389. See id. § 6(d), at 87-88.
390. For example, if the rendering court could obtain jurisdiction over the
dispute on the basis of the plaintiff's nationality, the defendant would have no
basis for objecting to jurisdiction in the foreign proceeding if there was no doubt
that the plaintiffs nationality was as asserted. See id. § 6(d), cmt. 6(d), at 88.
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available to parties who have mounted an unsuccessful objection to
the jurisdiction of the rendering court at the time of the initial

proceeding. 39 1
One of the most remarkable aspects of Section 6 is the way
that it expands the number and type of judgments that can be
recognized and enforced in the United States by reversing the
procedural approach to unacceptable bases of jurisdiction.3 9 2
Although some people may be concerned that the ALI has made
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments too easy, Section
6 does not exist in isolation. Instead, Section 6 works in conjunction
with other provisions that provide a limiting effect on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. 393 Furthermore, another of
the ALI's innovations-namely, the requirement of reciprocitymay result in even fewer judgments being recognized under the ALI
Proposed Statute than is currently the case.394
G.

Section 7 - Reciprocity

At this point, there is no consensus in the United States as to
whether reciprocity is a necessary part of the process of enforcing
and recognizing foreign judgments.3 9 5 While a number of states
However, the ALI takes the view that failure to enter an objection to jurisdiction
based on nationality in the underlying action should not preclude the judgment
debtor from doing so during an enforcement and recognition proceeding in the
United States. See id.
391. See id. § 6(d), at 87-88.
392. See id. § 6, at 84-85.
393. Section 5 is perhaps the most notable of these cross-references. See id.
§ 5, at 55-58, § 6, at 84-85 (detailing which bases for foreign jurisdiction will not
be recognized or enforced in the United States).
394. See id. § 7, at 92-94.
395. See id. § 7 cmt. a, at 94 (discussing history of reciprocity issue); see
also id. § 7 reporters' notes 2-3, at 98-100. Numerous scholars have considered
the wisdom of a reciprocity requirement in this field. See, e.g., John F. Coyle,
L.
REv.
92
N.C.
Reciprocity,
Judgments
Rethinking
(forthcoming 2014), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracti
d=2332290 (constructing an analytical framework for determining the conditions
under which reciprocal legislation is most likely to change the behavior of foreign
states); Richard W. Hulbert, Some Thoughts on Judgments, Reciprocity, and the
Seeming Paradox of InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
641, 646-56 (2008); Kathleen R. Miller, Playground Politics, Assessing the
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require reciprocity as a matter of state law, neither the 1962 Act, the
2005 Act, nor the Restatement includes such a requirement. 396
Given this background and the general pro-enforcement bias
of the ALI Proposed Statute, it is somewhat surprising that the ALI
would choose to require U.S. courts to deny recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment unless the courts of the foreign
state recognize and enforce "comparable judgments" of U.S.
courts.39 7 Although the ALI's approach has the benefit of creating a
nationally consistent standard, it also has the effect of limiting the
number and type of judgments that are eligible for recognition and
enforcement within the United States.39 8
The party resisting recognition and enforcement has the duty
of raising the lack of reciprocity "with specificity as an affirmative
defense" and has the "burden to show that there is substantial doubt"
that the courts in the rendering state would recognize or enforce
comparable judgments from the United States. 399 The showing of
non-reciprocity can be made "through expert testimony, or by
judicial notice if the law of the state of origin or decisions of its
courts are clear.'400 According to the ALI,
[t]he law or practice of the courts of the state of origin
may be demonstrated by statutes, decrees of generally
applicability, or current decisions of courts of last
resort, as well as by authoritative commentaries or
treatises or expert testimony, in accordance with Rule

Wisdom of Writing a Reciprocity Requirement Into U.S. InternationalRecognition
and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 239, 287-318 (2004) (discussing four
points to be considered in evaluating the prudence of a reciprocity requirement)
396. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71 (advocating uniformity across states
without requiring reciprocity); 1962 ACT, supra note 67, prefatory note (same); see
also supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting states that require reciprocity).
397. ALI, supra note 22, § 7(a), at 92; see also id. § 7 cmt. a, reporters' note
1, reporters' note 4, at 94, 98, 101-02.
398. See id. § 7 cmt. b, at 95. The ALI indicates that "[t]he purpose of the
reciprocity provision in this Act is . . . to create an incentive to foreign countries to

commit to recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in the United
States." Id. § 7 cmt. b, at 95. This type of technique has not always proven
successful in the past. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
399. ALI, supra note 22, § 7(b), at 92.
400. Id.
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44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
comparable state rules.4 0 1
Lower court decisions from the forein state are not
conclusive unless "a consistent pattern emerges."40
When making a determination regarding reciprocity, U.S.
courts are instructed to consider a number of issues, including
whether and to what extent the courts of the rendering state enforce:
* judgments from any state against nationals of the
rendering state;
* judgments from U.S. state or federal courts;
* judgments involving compensatory damages in cases
relating to personal injury and death;
* judgments for claims arising as a matter of statutory law;
and
* "particular types of judgments rendered by courts in the
United States similar to the foreign judgment for which
recognition or enforcement is sought."4 03
These factors are illustrative, rather than exhaustive, and no single
item should be considered conclusive. 404
Although the ALI Proposed Statute requires reciprocity in
most situations, there are certain exceptions to the rule. 405 For
example, some countries have expressed concerns about enforcing
tort judgments that provide damages for pain and suffering or that
have been awarded as a result of a jury verdict. 406 According to the
ALI, a foreign court's failure to enforce these types of judgments
need not affect a U.S. court's reciprocity analysis.4 0 7 Similarly, a

401.
402.
403.
404.

Id. § 7 cmt. e, at 96; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
ALI, supra note 22, § 7 cmt. e, at 96.
Id. § 7(c), at 93.
See id. § 7 cmt. f, at 97.

405. See id. § 7, at 92-94.
406. See id. §7 cmt. f, at 97 (discussing the refusal to enforce tort judgments
rendered in the United Slates).
407. See id. (explaining that the failure of tort judgments from a given
country to pass the test of reciprocity does not necessarily show lack of reciprocity
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foreign court's refusal to enforce U.S. judgments involving punitive,
exemplary, or multiple damages need not stop a U.S. court from
recognizing or enforcing judgments from that country.4 0 8
The ALI Proposed Statute also describes how the reciprocity
requirement might be met, stating that "[t]he Secretary of State is
authorized to negotiate agreements with foreign states or groups of
states setting forth reciprocal practices."409 These agreements, which
may be as broad or as narrow as the parties desire, would not need to
take the form of a formal treaty but could instead include various
types of soft law.4 10 Although the existence of one of these bilateral
or multilateral agreements would conclusively establish the element
of reciprocity with respect to the types of judgments covered by the
agreement, the absence of such an agreement or the inapplicability of
an agreement to a particular type of judgment would "not of itself
establish that the state fail[ed] to meet the reciprocity requirement"
under the ALI Proposed Statute.4 11 At this point, the United States
has not entered into any international agreements regarding
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, so this provision
*
*412
is entirely prospective in nature.
with regard to other kinds of judgments, such as judgments for breach of contract
or breach of a fiduciary relationship).
408. See id. § 7(d), at 93. However, the ALI Proposed Statute allows U.S.
courts to enforce foreign judgments involving these types of damages on a
reciprocal basis. See id.
409. Id. § 7(e), at 93. Game theorists argue that international agreements
would maximize mutual enforcement of foreign judgments. See Rosen, supra note
12, at 808-09.
410. See ALI, supra note 22, § 7 cmt. c, at 95-96 (suggesting the possible
use of diplomatic notes or memoranda of understanding); Andrew T. Guzman, A
Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1823, 1879
(2002).
411. ALI, supra note 22, § 7 cmt. c, at 95-96.
412. See id. § 7 reporters' note 3, at 100; see also Enforcement of
Judgments, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_691.
html; ALI, supra note 22, § 7 reporters' note 7, at 105 ("'National Treatment'
provisions in general Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties do not alone
qualify as 'agreements' or 'Memoranda of Understanding' within this section of
the [ALI Proposed Statute], although reciprocity accorded to U.S. judgments by a
foreign country pursuant to such a treaty might satisfy the reciprocity
requirement."); John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 302, 343 n.172
(2013).
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Section 8- Jurisdictionof U.S. Courts

The ALI Proposed Statute gives U.S. federal district courts
original jurisdiction to hear actions to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments, regardless of both the amount in controversy and the
citizenship or residence of the parties. 4 13 Jurisdiction in the federal
courts runs concurrently with jurisdiction in state courts, 414 and the
ALI offers two options relating to removal and remand.4 15 One of
these options relates only to enforcement actions (subsection b) and
the other relates to both enforcement and recognition actions
(subsections c and d).4 16 Neither the 1962 Act nor the 2005 Act
contain any similar provisions, since both of those enactments were
meant to be adopted at the state level.4 17
I.

Section 9 - Enforcement Procedures

One of the major problems with the 1962 Act and the
Restatement was the failure to provide adequate guidance regarding
the procedures to be used in recognition and enforcement
proceedings.418
Although the 2005 Act reflected some
improvements in that regard, the ALI provides somewhat more
comprehensive discussion of the procedures to be used in
413. ALI, supra note 22, § 8(a), at 105.
414. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2013); ALI, supra note 22, § 8(a)-(b), at 105.
Removal may take place without regard to either the amount in controversy or the
citizenship or residence of the parties. See id. Claims that are not related to the
foreign judgment may be remanded to state court by the district court in its
discretion. See id.
415. See ALI, supra note 22, § 8 cmt. a, at 107.
416. See id. § 8(bHd), at 105-07.
417. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71; 1962 ACT, supra note 67. This aspect of
the ALI Proposed Statute is somewhat similar to the jurisdictional provisions of
international chapters of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See 9 U.S.C. §§ 203,
302 (2013); ALI, supra note 22, § 8 cmt. a, at 107.
418. See 1962 ACT, supra note 67 (noting that a foreign judgment is
enforceable if it meets the requirements set out in Section 2, but providing no
guidelines for actual enforcement); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§§ 481-82 (providing no guidelines for the enforcement of the foreign judgments);
BRAND, supra note 1, at 5.
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recognition and enforcement actions. 4 19 Under the ALI Proposed
Statute, there are two ways in which a foreign judgment can be
recognized and enforced in the United States: a civil action to
recognize or enforce a judgment (Section 9) and registration of a
foreign judgment (Section 10).420 Both procedures are analogous to
those that are currently in use in the United States. 42 1
The procedures described in Section 9 can be used with any
kind of foreign judgment falling within the terms of the ALI
Proposed Statute, including judgments for the payment of money,
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, orders to return property or
perform some other activity, and judgments following default in the
422
A party seeking to have a judgment recognized or
foreign court.
enforced under Section 9 simply needs to bring a civil action in
either state or federal court in the location where the judgment debtor
is subject to personal jurisdiction or where the judgment debtor has
assets. 423 Process is to be served in accordance with the relevant
provisions of state or federal law,42 4 which may permit or require
recourse to international treaties such as the Hague Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention).4 2 5
419. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71, §§ 6, 7(2); ALI, supra note 22, § 9, at
111-12; see also supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
420. See ALI, supra note 22, §§9-10, at 111-12, 119-23; see also id.
§ 9(a)(ii), at 111; infra notes 448-53 and accompanying text.
421. See ALI, supra note 22, § 9, cmt. a, at 112.
422. See id. § 9, cmt. a, at 113.
423. See id. § 9(a)-(b), cmt. b, reporters' note 1, at 111, 113, 116; see also
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977). Venue is established pursuant
to the standard rules. See ALI, supra note 22, § 9 cmt. b, at 114.
424. See ALI, supra note 22, § 9(c), at 111.
425. See, e.g, Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 658
U.N.T.S. 163, 20.1 U.S.T. 361 ("The present Convention shall apply in all cases,
in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or
extrajudicial document for service abroad."). However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has largely eviscerated the effectiveness of the Hague Service Convention by
interpreting it as merely supplementing existing U.S. procedures. See Patrick J.
Borchers, The Incredible Shrinking Hague Evidence Convention, 38 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 73, 73 (2003) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Convention
as simply an "add-on" to current U.S. procedures); see also Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1986); Grossi, supra note 381,
at 631-32.
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Interestingly, the ALI Proposed Statute expressly
contemplates the possibility that a party might bring several
enforcement actions simultaneously in the United States. 426 Multiple
actions are typically necessary if there are insufficient assets in a
single U.S. state or federal district to satisfy the foreign judgment in
whole.
Multiple enforcement proceedings are permitted so long as
the judgment creditor designates one of the various actions as the
"main enforcement action.'"427 Thus, "at least one such action must
be brought in the state or federal court for the place where the
judgment debtor . . . is domiciled or . . . has its principal
establishment in the United States, or where the judgment debtor has
substantial assets." 428 Inability to establish jurisdiction in one of
these ways will cause the action to recognize or enforce the foreign
judgment to fail.4 29 This requirement means that judgment creditors
may not bring an action to enforce or recognize a foreign judgment
in the United States in anticipation of assets later coming into the
jurisdiction. 430
I
The action in the place where the judgment debtor is
domiciled or has its principal establishment is deemed to be the
"main enforcement action," and the court in that location is
designated as the "main enforcement court."431 If the judgment
debtor does not bring an action in that location or there is no such
place, then the "main enforcement action" (and corresponding "main
enforcement court") are situated in the place where the judgment
debtor has substantial assets.4 3 2
The purpose of designating a main enforcement action and a
main enforcement court is to allow all issues concerning recognition
of the judgment to be determined at a single time, by a single

426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

See ALI, supra note 22, § 9(d)(iii), at 112.
Id. § 9(d)(iii), at 112; see also id. § 9 cmt. d, at 114.
Id. § 9(d)(i), at 111.
See id. § 9 reporters' note 2, at 117.
See id. § 9 reporters' note 2, at 117-18.
Id. § 9(d)(ii), at 111- 12.
Id.
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judge.4 33 This approach is most efficient and strikes an appropriate
balance between party autonomy and procedural fairness by limiting
excessive forum shopping while allowing parties seeking recognition
and enforcement some freedom to choose the place of
enforcement. 434
Once the main enforcement action is identified, other
pending enforcement actions are stayed.4 35 However, other courts
can still hear matters related to "the propriety of .. . [any] attachment
or garnishment [in that jurisdiction], exemptions of property from
attachment or garnishment, or the title to such assets.'A36
Furthermore, "[a]ny court where an action to enforce is pending
may ... require the party resisting enforcement to post security to
prevent dissipation of assets" in that jurisdiction.437 Once the main
enforcement court has made its determination, "[t]he decision on
recognition shall be binding on . . . every other court in the United

States.A38
The ALI Proposed Statute's procedure for civil enforcement
actions marks a significant improvement over existing law. Not only
does the ALI Proposed Statute provide a clear and consistent means
of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments, 439 it also discusses
433. See id. § 9(d)(iv), at 112 (giving the main enforcement court authority
to produce a binding judgment while staying all other enforcement proceedings in
U.S. courts).
434. See id. § 9 cmt. d, at 114 ("The purpose of subsection (d) is to offer the
judgment creditor a choice as to where the issue is to be heard, but to provide a
limit on forum shopping.").
435. See id. § 9(d)(iv), at 112.
436. Id. § 9 cmt. e, at 115.
437. Id. § 9(e), at 112. Such a procedure may be useful "[w]here litigation
of a defense is likely to be protracted." Id. § 9 cmt. f, at 115.
438. Id. § 9(d)(iv), at 112. Mutual recognition is not guaranteed under
existing law. See id. § 9 reporters's note 3, at 118.
439. See id. § 9 reporters' note 3, at 118-19 (describing the ALI Proposed
Statute as intending to provide a "uniform national standard" for enforcing foreign
judgments). The current procedural approach is somewhat confusing. For
example, some but not all states currently allow summary proceedings in cases
involving the recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments. See id. § 9 cmt. g,
at 115-16 (acknowledging that some states allow summary proceedings while the
rest follow the federal government in not doing so); see also N.Y.C.P.L.R. 3213;
supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text. However, "[i]f the judgment debtor
opposes summary judgment and the motion is denied . .. the action to enforce the
judgment would proceed as an ordinary civil action." ALI, supra note 22, § 9 cmt.
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certain issues (including simultaneous proceedings) not covered by
the 1962 Act, the 2005 Act, or the Restatement. 440
J,

Section 10 - RegistrationofForeign Judgments

The second way in which a foreign judgment may be
enforced under the ALI Proposed Statute is through a registration
procedure similar to that provided for in federal courts under 28
U.S.C. § 1963 and in state courts under legislation modeled on the
1964 Act.44 1 The registration procedure is only available if the
judgment in question has been rendered by "the court of a state that
has entered into an agreement with the United States for reciprocal
recognition of judgments pursuant to §7(e)" of the ALI Proposed
Statute. 442 Since no such agreements currently exist, this section
would not be operative even if Congress adopted the ALI proposal
today.443
Given the current inapplicability of the registration process,
this Article will not conduct a detailed analysis of the procedures
themselves.44 4 Nevertheless, it is useful to note that the ALI
proposed the registration procedure with two purposes in mind: first,
to provide an incentive to foreign countries to enter into international
agreements regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments and, second, to standardize the registration process

g, at 116. In federal court and some state courts, "the action would be commenced
by filing a complaint with the court," although the motion for summary judgment
could be made within the next twenty days. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
440. Compare 2005 ACT, supra note 71 (failing to address simultaneous
proceedings, among other issues), and 1962 ACT, supra note 67 (same), with ALI,
supra note 22, § 9, at 111-12 (noting possibility of parallel suits).
441. See ALI, supra note 22, § 10, at 119-23 (describing the process by
which a party can enforce a foreign judgment in U.S. federal court); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1963 (2013); 1964 ACT, supra note 88; ALI, supra note 22, § 10(a), at
124.
442. ALI, supra note 22, § 10(a), at 119. The provision also indicates that
the registration procedure is only available in cases involving judgments for the
payment of money following a contested (i.e., non-default) proceeding. See id.
443. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
444. For a discussion of the registration process and procedures, see ALI,
supra note 22, § 10 comments and reporters' notes, at 119-31.
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nationwide." 5 Furthermore, registration procedures are meant to be
significantly faster and less complicated than the kind of full
proceedings contemplated under Section 9 of the ALI Proposed
Statute." 6
K.

Section 11 - Declining Jurisdiction

Parallel litigation is a growing problem in transnational
disputes, and U.S. courts need to know when it is proper to decline
jurisdiction in favor of an action pending elsewhere.44 7 Because
"[d]eclination of jurisdiction ... is closely related to recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments" (in that both procedures require a
determination that jurisdiction is proper in a foreign court),
the
ALI Proposed Statute includes a section describing when a U.S.
court should stay or dismiss an action in favor of a foreign
proceeding.449
At this point, "there is no general rule in the United States
concerning lis pendens, either in domestic or in international
litigation," and neither the 1962 Act nor the 2005 Act address this

445. See id. § 10 cmt. a, at 124. Standardization occurs because the ALI
Proposed Statute not only restricts registration proceedings in federal courts, but
also limits similar proceedings in state court. See id. § 10(a), at 119 ("A judgment
not eligible for registration under this section may not be registered in a state
court.").
446. See id. § 10 cmt. a, at 124; see also id. § 9, at 111-12.
447. See N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent
Treatment of InternationalParallelProceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 601,
603 (2006) (noting this is a highly unsettled area of law); Austen L. Parrish,
Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 237, 239-40 (2010)
("What should a court do when a lawsuit involving the same parties and the same
issues is already pending in the court of another country? Finding a coherent
answer to this question has not been easy. Yet a need to find one exists."); Teitz,
supra note 12, at 3-5 (addressing a growing awareness of the need to better
regulate parallel proceedings to enforce foreign judgments).
448. ALI, supra note 22, § 11 cmt. a, at 132 (noting declination of
jurisdiction can involve principles of lis pendens and forum non conveniens).
COCA also demonstrates the link between the declination of jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. See COCA, supra note 4, arts.
5(2), 6, 8-9 (describing the appropriate jurisdiction of courts and enforceability of
judgments in contracting states in light of an exclusive choice of court agreement).
449. See ALI, supra note 22, § 11, at 131-32.
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issue.4 50 However, the ALI Proposed Statute requires a U.S. court to
stay or dismiss an action pending before it if
it is shown that a proceeding concerning the same
subject matter and including the same or related
parties as adversaries has previously been brought and
is pending in the courts of a foreign state [and] . . . if

(i) the foreign court's jurisdiction is not unacceptable
under § 6; and (ii) the foreign court is likely to render
a timely judgment entitled to recognition [under the
ALI Proposed Statute].4 5 1
Although the ALI's primary purpose in adopting these
procedures was to avoid inconsistent outcomes, this approach also
"promotes both justice and efficient use of judicial resources.'452
Thus, the mere fact that "different causes of action or different styles
of pleading are involved, or ... not all the parties are the same in the
two fora" is insufficient to cause a court to decline jurisdiction
"when the underlying controversy is the same.'A53 However, "[t]he
fact that different members of the same corporate group or closely
affiliated entities are involved in the different fora does not
necessarily preclude a declination of jurisdiction."454
Even if the required criteria are met, U.S. courts have the
discretionary power to decline a request to stay or dismiss an action
if the party bringing the action in the United States can show "that
the jurisdiction of the foreign court was invoked with a view to
frustrating the exercise of jurisdiction" of a U.S. court when the U.S.
court "would be the more appropriate forum," that the foreign
proceedings are "vexatious or frivolous," or "that there are other
450. Id. § 11 reporters' note 1, at 133. The closest analogue in the 1962 Act
and the 2005 Act is language indicating that a U.S. court may stay an action to
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment pending an appeal in the foreign court.
See 1962 ACT, supra note 67, § 6; 2005 ACT, supra note 71, § 6.
451. ALI, supra note 22,§ 11(a), at 131.
452. Id. § 11 reporters' note 1, at 134; see also id. § 11 reporters' note 3, at
135-36 (discussing how a strict lis pendens rule could create hardships for parties
wishing to litigate in the United States).
453. Id. § 11 cmt. e, at 133.
454. Id.
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persuasive reasons" for allowing the two cases to go forward
simultaneously.4 5 5
This type of "escape hatch" could prove
problematic, since the notion that the United States might be the
"more appropriate" forum could open the door to a somewhat
parochial approach to questions of jurisdiction.4 5 6 Nevertheless,
such a provision may be necessary because application of a "strict lis
pendens rule could work substantial hardship for parties seeking to
litigate in a U.S. forum" due to "the substantial differences in the
procedures and available remedies between litigation in the United
States and in other countries.A57
Although some people may oppose the ALI Proposed Statute
based on the belief that "the United States should not add to the
handicap of a generous law of recognition and enforcement by
refusing to allow domestic litigants and courts to run a race to
judgment," the ALI approach reflects the view that "the costs of
parallel litigation are visited on domestic parties and domestic
courts" as well as on foreign parties and foreign courts.45 8
455. Id. § 11(b), at 131-32. These principles have their basis in the
Leuven/London "Principles on Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in Civil and
Commercial Matters" issued by the International Law Association Committee on
International Civil and Commercial Litigation in 2000. See id. § 11 reporters' note
2, at 135; see also Int'l Law Ass'n, Internationaland Civil Litigation, Res. No.
1/2000 (July 25-29, 2000).
456. Problems may arise in cases where the concept of a "more appropriate
forum" is combined with the notion of "vexatious or frivolous" foreign
proceedings to result in an anti-suit injunction. ALI, supra note 22, § 11(b), at
132. Although the United States is said to be cautious about issuing anti-suit
injunctions, requests for anti-suit relief appear to be on the rise. See id. § 11
reporters' note 4, at 137-38. Furthermore, "[t]he Supreme Court has not
considered the appropriate standard that lower courts should employ when
considering whether to issue an anti-suit injunction in the context of foreign
parallel proceedings," and "[t]he circuits are currently split" on this and related
issues. Id. § 11 reporters' note 4, at 138.
457. Id. 11 reporters' note 3, at 135. The ALI rule can therefore be
characterized as a limited form of lis pendens, since it directs U.S. courts to respect
the jurisdiction of the court first seised of the matter in most situations and thereby
give precedence to the plaintiffs choice of forum. See id. § 11 cmts. b-d, at 13233; see also Silberman, Impact, supra note 6, at 339-46 (advocating a "modified
lis pendens rule"). "For purposes of determining when a litigation is commenced
in the foreign forum, the court in the United States should look to the law of that
forum." ALI, supra note 22, § 11 cmt. c, at 133.
458. Burbank, Equilibration,supra note 6, at 233; see also ALI, supra note
22, § 11, at 131-32.
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"Moreover, the general faith in other legal systems . .. has a firmer

basis today than it did 100 years ago, as does the concept of an
international system whose needs should be considered in the
formulation and application of national law.'A5 9 Thus, the ALI's
increased respect for the concept of lis pendens appears appropriate,
given the realities and demands of contemporary international legal
practice and policy.
L.

Section 12 - ProvisionalMeasures

The ALI Proposed Statute includes an innovative provision
that allows U.S. courts to exercise their discretion to provide
provisional aid in support of an order of a foreign court that is
intended "to secure enforcement of a judgment entitled to
recognition and enforcement" under the ALI Proposed Statute or "to
provide security or disclosure of assets in connection with
proceedings likely to result" in an enforceable judgment.46 0 Before
the U.S. court can provide such assistance, the party seeking the
provisional relief must make a showing that the
judgment debtor or defendant is likely to dispose of or
conceal assets, that the assets within the jurisdiction
of the foreign court are or are likely to be insufficient
to meet the obligations determined to be owing in the
principle action, and that the judgment debtor or
defendant has been given notice and a reasonable
opportunity to be heard before the court of origin or
that it was impossible to give such notice.4 6 1
When considering provisional measures of this type, U.S.
courts "may, in the interests of justice, communicate directly with
the foreign court."A62
A court is permitted to "make use of such remedies and
procedures as are available to it in connection with ordinary
459.
460.
461.
462.

Burbank, Equilibration,supra note 6, at 233.
ALI, supra note 22, § 12(a), cmt. c, at 139, 142.
Id. § 12(b), at 139-40.
Id. § 12(f), at 141.
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proceedings in courts in the United States." 463 Therefore, the
procedures and notice to be used under this provision are to be
determined by the "applicable state statute or rule."464
This provision allows federal courts to freeze assets located
anywhere within the United StateS465 and "would enable courts in the
United States to issue an ancillary order in support of the order of a
foreign court, with a view, in appropriate cases, to subsequently
enforcing a judgment of that court against assets in the United States
so restrained."4 66 The ALI limits freezing orders issued by federal
courts for assets located within the United States, although nothing
in this provision imposes a similar limit on state courts.4 6 Notably,
the order on which the U.S. order is based does not need to be final;
instead, the foreign order may be interim in nature. 468
Notice relating to freezing orders, as well as any other type of
order, can and must be rendered to the judgment debtor or defendant
in the foreign action regardless of whether that person is "present in
or subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States."469 The
notice must be sufficient to give the judgment debtor or defendant a
reasonable opportunity to contest the order or seek its

463. Id. § 12(c)(i), at 140.
464. Id. § 12(d), at 140.
465. See id. § 12(c)(ii), at 140. The procedure and notice to be used in this
context must comply with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
concerning anti-suit injunctions. See id. § 12(d), at 140.
466. Id. § 12(a), at 141. The U.S. freezing order would operate something
like the Mareva injunction in England, in that it would not create priority relating
to creditors but would instead simply restrain banks and similar entities from
allowing transfer or other disposition of the assets. See id. § 12(a) at 141; see also
id. § 12 reporters' notes 1-3, at 143-45 (discussing scope and use of Mareva
injunctions in England and elsewhere); supra note 222 and accompanying text.
467. See ALI, supra note 22, § 12(d), at 143.
468. See id. § 12(a), at 139 (discussing provisional relief). Allowing
enforcement of interim orders helps potential judgment creditors guard against the
wrongful transfer of assets outside the jurisdiction by the potential judgment
debtor, something that is becoming increasingly easy to do. See id. § 12(b), at
142; see also Jay A. Soled, Implications of Discovering Unreported Income,
Improper Deductions, and Hidden Assets Upon a Taxpayer's Death, 44 GA. L.
REv. 697, 724-25 (2010) (outlining application requirements for provisional
relief).
469. ALI, supra note 22, § 12(d), at 140.
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modification.4 7 0 Parties who seek these types of provisional orders
may be required to give secunty.471
There is nothing in the ALI Proposed Statute that prohibits
parties from seeking other types of provisional relief, such as
attachments, under state law.472 However, orders under this section
must take into account other forms of protection, such as sums
frozen in other jurisdictions or paid to the foreign court, so that the
U.S. order can be appropriately tailored to the circumstances. 473
Neither the 1962 Act nor the 2005 Act discuss the
enforcement of provisional relief, so the ALI Proposed Statute is a
significant improvement in this regard.4 74 Furthermore, the ALI has
devised a means of balancing the interests of both judgment debtors
and judgment creditors while addressing the very real problems
associated with the potential for fraudulent disposal of assets before
and after judgment.
M.

Section 13 - Foreign Orders Concerning U.S.
Litigation

The ALI Proposed Statute closes with a provision indicating
that foreign orders "that may concern or affect litigation in the
United States may be taken into account for purposes of determining
motions to stay, dismiss, or otherwise regulate related proceedings in
the United States."4 76 In these cases, the U.S. court is not enforcing
470. See id.
471. See id. § 12(e), at 141.
472. See id. § 12 cmt. b, at 142.
473. See id. (noting "only such sum as is necessary to meet the underlying
obligation should be restrained by order of the court in the United States").
474. See 2005 ACT, supra note 71; 1962 ACT, supra note 67.
475. See David E. Peterson et al., Is the Homestead Subject to the Statute on
FraudulentAsset Conversions?, 68 FLA. BAR J. 12, 14-15 (1994); Geoffrey Sant,
The Rejection of the Separate Entity Rule Validates the Separate Entity Rule, 65
SMU L. REV. 813 (2012) (discussing international asset recovery in New York);
see also Basel Institute of Governance: InternationalCentre for Asset Recovery,
BASEL INSTITUTE OF GOVERNANCE, http://www.baselgovemance.org/icar/ (last
visited Nov. 5, 2013) (discussing an international training program to assist with
international asset recovery).
476. ALI, supra note 22, § 13, at 147. For example, litigation between
parties A and B may be heard in country 1, with a related litigation between parties
B and C in country 2. See id. § 12 cmt. b, at 148 (justifying the requirement for
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the foreign order but is instead taking that order and its underlying
rationales into account when determining whether to stay or dismiss
a U.S. action. 477 Such an approach allows U.S. courts to act in
harmony with foreign courts in appropriate circumstances, although
a U.S. court "will not accord respect to a foreign order, such as an
anti-suit injunction or blocking order, that appears designed to
frustrate proceedings in the United States.'A 78

V.

CONCLUSION

As the preceding analysis shows, the ALI Proposed Statute
provides numerous and significant improvements over existing
methods of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments in the
United States.4 79 Although the most obvious benefits relate to
uniformity and consistency, the ALI has also created an enforcement
regime that is fair, efficient and practical as a matter of both
substantive and procedural law. Furthermore, the ALI has provided
a more comprehensive approach to recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments than currently exists and has anticipated a number
of issues that are becoming increasingly important in a globalized
legal environment.
Although the ALI Proposed Statute reflects numerous
advantages, observers anticipate that it will be some time before
Congress moves to enact legislation of this type. 480 One potential
stumbling block is the belief that the proposal's pro-enforcement
bias may injure U.S. parties and interests in some way, particularly
in the wake of what is sometimes seen as a rising tide of abusive
applicants to show that the debtor may move or hide assets). Parties finding
themselves in these situations may seek a protective order designed to limit or
prevent information developed in one jurisdiction from being disclosed or used in
the other jurisdiction. See id. Such provisions may be necessary because different
legal systems have adopted different rules regarding the future use of documents
produced in and for litigation. See CPR 31.22 (Eng.) (noting "[a] party to whom a
document has been disclosed may use the document only for the purpose of the
proceedings in which it is disclosed," with some minor exceptions).
477. See ALI, supra note 22, § 13(a), at 147.
478. Id. § 13 cmt. a, at 148.
479. See id. § 13 cmt. a, at 129-49; see also supra notes 201-485 and
accompanying text.
480. See Burbank, Equilibration,supra note 6, at 231.
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foreign judgments. 4 8 1 However, closer analysis of the proposed
statute shows that the various pro-enforcement measures are
tempered by numerous provisions limiting recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. 482 This sort of balanced approach
protects U.S. interests not only by curtailing the recognition and
enforcement of judgments that have been rendered in legally suspect
circumstances but by facilitating the easy recognition and
enforcement of judgments that are procedurally unobjectionable.
In the past, efforts to reform the recognition and enforcement
process in the United States have been thwarted by corporate
interests that found it useful to make the enforcement process as
difficult and as expensive as possible.4 8 3 Because most problems
were experienced by foreign parties who had virtually no voice in
the U.S. legislative process, there was traditionally very little
motivation to change the status quo.4 84
As economies and societies have become more globalized, a
number of policies and practices that once seemed protective of U.S.
parties and interests have experienced something of a backlash.4 8 5
As a result, the U.S. business community is coming to recognize that
a predictable and uniform method of recognizing and enforcing
foreign judgments actually works to the advantage of U.S.
For example, creating an
companies and individuals.4 8 6
481. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. In fact, U.S. parties and
interests suffer more grievous injuries from an inefficient and unpredictable
enforcement regime. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 210, 395-412 and accompanying text.
483. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 12, at 1450-51 (suggesting that
the breakdown of the enforcement process produces a justice gap); Christina
Weston, Comment, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment-Recognition Defenses
as a Loophole to CorporateAccountabilityfor Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT'L
L. REv. 731, 750-54 (2011) (explaining that corporate defendants can drag out
suits for decades with this "backup plan"). This tactic may have been based on the
theory that foreign courts cannot be trusted to be neutral (an assumption that has
driven many multinational corporations to arbitration) or on the grounds that any
method of avoiding paying a judgment is an inherent good.
484. While foreign interests can be asserted through diplomatic pressure,
such efforts are not always successful, predictable, or uniform.
485. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 12, at 1451; Weston, supra note
483, at 750-54.
486. See ICC Calls on Governments to FacilitateCross-BorderLitigation,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.iccwbo.
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internationally acceptable enforcement regime would eliminate the
possibility of a "litigation premium" in cross-border transactions and
reduce the cost of doing business internationally, thereby allowing
companies to lower prices on U.S. consumer goods and services.
Individual parties (both foreign and domestic) would also experience
fewer costs, delays, and uncertainties when seeking to have a foreign
judgment recognized and enforced in the United States.4 88 These
advantages would accrue to U.S. parties regardless of whether they
were the ones resisting enforcement procedures or bringing them. 489
At this point, it is unclear what steps the Hague Conference
on Private International Law will take with respect to a new
convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.4 9 0 However, any efforts in that regard would not be
finalized for many years. Therefore, it is in the best interests of the
United States and U.S. parties that Congress consider domestic
methods of improving the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in the United States. While the ALI Proposed Statute is
not perfect, 49 1 it appears to provide a practical and jurisprudentially
sound means of doing so and should be considered a strong
contender for adoption at the federal level.4 92

org/News/Articles/2012/ICC-calls-on-governments-to-facilitate-cross-borderlitigation/; Bellinger Testimony, supra note 27.
487. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
488. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
489. While no data is currently available as to precise numbers, it is logical
to assume that U.S. parties would be at least as likely to be the party moving to
have a foreign judgment enforced or recognized in the United States (primarily,
but not solely, for purposes of preclusion) as they would to be the party resisting
such efforts as a judgment debtor. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
490. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
491. Indeed, some observers have already proposed various amendments to
the ALI's proposal. See Bellinger Testimony, supra note 27 (suggesting that the
proposal could clarify the public policy exception for non-recognition).
Furthermore, the ALI Proposed Statute does not appear to address issues relating
to constitutional limitations on U.S. courts' jurisdiction over the person or property
in question. See ALI, supra note 22, at 18-29 (discussing Section 9 under the
proposed statute, which contemplates action "where the judgment debtor is subject
to personal jurisdiction" or "where assets belonging to the judgment debtor are
situated," but not indicating whether constitutional tests must be met); see also
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
492. See ALI, supra note 22, at 29-149.

